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Abstract 
 
This paper compares market designs intended to solve the resource adequacy (RA) 
problem, and finds that, in spite of rivalrous claims, the most advanced designs have 
nearly converged. The original dichotomy between approaches based on long-term 
energy contracts and those based on short-term capacity markets spawned two design 
tracks. Long-term energy contracts led to call-option obligations which provide market-
power control and the ability to strengthen performance incentives, but this approach fails 
to replace the missing money at the root of the adequacy problem. Hogan’s (2005) 
energy-only market fills this gap. 
 On the other track, the short-term capacity markets (ICAP) spawned long-term 
capacity market designs. In 2004, ISO New England proposed a short-term market with 
hedged performance incentives essentially based on high spot prices. In 2005, we 
developed for New England a forward capacity market, with load obligated to purchase a 
target level of capacity covered by an energy call option. 
 The two tracks have now converged on two conclusions: (1) High real-time energy 
prices should provide performance incentives. (2) High energy prices should be hedged 
with call options. We argue that two more conclusions are needed: (3) Capacity targets 
rather than high and volatile spot prices should guide investment, and (4) Long-term 
physically based options should be purchased in a forward market for capacity. The result 
will be that adequacy is maintained, performance incentives are restored, market power 
and risks are reduced from present levels, and prices are hedged down to a level below 
the present price cap. 
                                                 
1 We are grateful for funding from California's Electricity Oversight Board and the National Science 
Foundation. 
2 We thank the ISO-NE team for unflagging support in the form of new ideas, reality checks and patience 
with many revisions to the market designs. We also thank Erik Saltmarsh of the EOB for help with the 
California context and for providing this opportunity to freely discuss such a controversial and timely area 
of market design. We are grateful for helpful comments from EOB staff. The views in this paper are solely 
the views of the authors and do not represent the views of EOB or ISO-NE. References and other material 
are available at stoft.com. 
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1. Preamble 
California may need new capacity even sooner than it can be built, but implementing a 
useful resource adequacy (RA) program takes time. In the mean time, it is better to use a 
clean, well-tested, stop-gap measure, such as RFPs for new generation, than to implement 
a half-baked temporary RA program. The erroneous structures and commitments 
implemented by such a program will be painful to dispose off, as is still being 
demonstrated by California’s last round of long-term contracts. 
 
There is also an economic reason to avoid a temporary RA program. It will not work. 
RA programs, whether short-term ICAP markets or long-term energy contract markets, 
work, if they do, by signaling investors that they can expect stable and reasonable cost-
recovery for many years to come. No temporary program can achieve this. It is just not in 
the nature of “temporary.” 
 
Even long-term energy-contract proposals cover at most the first three years of a new 
twenty-plus year investment, and many do not cover even the first minute, because they 
terminate before any new project could go on line. Even if a temporary RA program 
required five-year contracts starting three years from the requirement date, such contracts 
would be forced to include a hefty risk premium to be effective. Why? Because the new 
investor would still face a completely unknown cost-recovery regime at the end of those 
five years. At least fifteen out of 20 years (and most likely 20 out of 20 years) of 
necessary cost recovery will be up for grabs when a temporary program’s contract is 
signed. 
 
RA programs do not accomplish much with their monthly payments or even with a 
year or two of contract coverage starting after the plant is built. They achieve their goals 
through expectations. When Intel builds a new chip-fabricating plant, it does not do so on 
the basis of contracts for chip sales from that plant. Those chips have not even been 
designed. It builds fabricating capacity completely on the basis of positive expectations. 
RA programs that work, must replace the enormous regulatory risk of the present with 
expectations of stable cost recovery for twenty years. This is no easy task, and an RA 
policy stamped “TEMPORARY,” cannot succeed. It may pay out large sums of money, 
which will be gladly accepted by existing generation, but it will not induce new 
investment at anything close to a reasonable price.3 
 
Since a temporary program is needed, how can this dilemma be avoided? Very 
simply. Sign truly long-term contracts with investors who build new generation. This will 
give these particular suppliers the strong expectations of long-term stable cost recovery 
that they require before they can charge the consumers of California a low risk premium. 
With the assurance of a truly long-term contract, competition among proposals can hold 
the price down to a reasonable level. Using a temporary RA program is an expensive new 
idea that should be retired as quickly as possible. Using RFPs for this purpose is not a 
clever new idea, but it works. 
                                                 
3 In fact, for an existing supplier, a failing RA program would be ideal, since existing generation would be 
paid, but no new competitors would enter the market. 
  3   
2. Summary 
The core recommendation of this paper is to use the best design features from the various 
existing RA approaches; all have something to offer. Use the capacity targets of the ICAP 
design track, the High Spot Prices and call options of the energy-only track, and a 
centralized forward market which is found in both design tracks. As Singh first noted in 
2000, elements from the energy-only and ICAP tracks are not fundamentally antagonistic 
but can be used to complement each other. This is demonstrated by the forward capacity 
market (FCM) design developed for ISO-NE and described below. 
 
The resource adequacy problem. The goal of resource adequacy is to minimize 
consumer cost including the cost of blackouts, but the central problem of resource 
adequacy is to restore the missing money that prevents adequate investment in generating 
capacity. More precisely, the problem is that current market-design parameters, such as 
offer caps, have been set to control market power, and consequently have been set too 
low for adequacy. Current energy markets underpay investors whenever investment 
brings capacity close to the adequate level. The result is that investment stops well before 
reaching the adequate level. 
 
The amount of money missing when capacity is adequate has been estimated in ISO-
NE at over $2 billion per year. More importantly, at the adequate capacity level, peakers 
can expect to cover perhaps as little as one quarter of their fixed costs. The CAISO’s 
lower offer cap of $250 leaves less room for fixed-cost recovery. 
 
The root cause of the RA problem is a pair of demand side flaws which make it 
impossible for the market to assess, even approximately, the value placed on reliability 
by consumers. Without information on the value of reliability, the market cannot 
determine the adequate level of capacity, since that is defined by the value of reliability. 
 
A comparison of ten approaches.  This section summarizes four theoretical energy-
only approaches, the standard ICAP approach used in Eastern markets, a theoretical long-
term ICAP approach and four convergent approaches, two of which are theoretical. The 
other two are the LICAP approach largely accepted for ISO-NE by the FERC’s 
administrative law judge, and a forward market design presented here as a theoretical 
design, but which is mimicked fairly closely by the current stakeholder compromise in 
New England. 
 
These proposals are judged according to six fundamental design choices. (1) Is 
adequate capacity explicitly targeted? (2) Is the missing money restored? (3) Do the 
forward contracts cover new capacity? (4) Are the required contracts purely financial? (5) 
Are performance signals market-based? (6) To what extent is load hedged? 
 
Energy-only markets fail to target capacity, and with one exception, fail to restore 
the missing money. Standard ICAP designs fail to provide market-based incentives and 
hedge load. (Failure to hedge load, also indicates a failure to hedge capacity and reduce 
spot market power.)  Convergent designs do better, and the forward capacity market 
presented here is designed to show that all six choices can be made correctly—there is no 
need for a tradeoff. 
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Proposed solution. To solve the RA problem, the missing money must be restored 
without reintroducing the market power problems currently controlled by price 
suppression. Moreover, inadequate investment is not the only problem caused by energy-
price suppression; it is only the most obvious. Crucial performance and quality incentives 
are also missing. All of these problems can be solved with a three step design process. 
 
 Step 1:  Design full-strength spot prices 
 Step 2:  Hedge all load with call options 
 Step 3:  Purchase an adequate level of hedged capacity 
 
The full-strength, High Spot Prices solve the problems caused by suppressing spot 
prices, but would reintroduce market power and risk problems were they not hedged. Call 
options that cover all load eliminate these side effects while perfectly preserving the 
performance and quality incentives of the high prices. All that remains, to restore the 
missing money and induce an adequate level of capacity, is to pay enough for the 
capacity-backed hedges. 
 
Either a short-term or a forward capacity market (FCM) can be used to buy the 
capacity at the market price. An FCM is recommended. It buys capacity three years in 
advance, and gives new capacity multi-year contracts. Existing capacity receives annual 
contracts at a similar price. The combination provides a low-risk environment for 
investors, which greatly reduces the risk premiums passed on to load. 
 
What the market can’t do. The market, without administrative guidance, cannot 
determine what level of installed capacity is needed to provide adequate reliability. This 
is a consequence of two Demand-Side Flaws caused by infrastructure problems that will 
not be remedied for perhaps another decade or more. The administrator has only two 
choices: set key market parameters without regard for their investment consequences, or 
adopt a conscious resource adequacy program. 
 
This point is important, because one of the most widely accepted reasons for 
choosing one RA approach over another is the notion that one provides more (or 
complete) market guidance with respect to how much capacity is adequate. 
Unfortunately, current markets provide no guidance whatsoever, except by passing 
through guidance (or confusion) from administrators. For example, MISO states “The 
principal reason for considering an energy-only market approach … is the expectation 
that it would allow market incentives, rather than centralized administrative direction, to 
drive investment decisions.” This reason is not correct. 
 
The energy-only approach. Hogan’s (2005) proposal of an energy-only approach is 
the inspiration for the MISO’s hope of avoiding centralized administrative direction. Yet 
the transfer of missing money used by that proposal to solve the adequacy problem is 
controlled by an administratively determined energy+reserve demand curve. The 
parameters set by administrators fully control the flow of all scarcity revenues above the 
variable cost of a new peaker. That could amount to $4 billion annually in a 50 GW 
market. Hence, the energy-only approach, if designed to restore missing money, is no-
more free of central planning than an ICAP approach. 
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This does not mean markets cannot play a crucial role. In fact they should be given 
full control of all the more difficult investment issues. They are needed to assure the low 
cost, high quality, and performance of the capacity purchased, to select who should build 
and where plants should be built, to determine the proportion of base-load plants, and 
much more. 
 
Replacing the missing money. ICAP markets are designed specifically to replace the 
missing money, caused by spot-price suppression, and thereby restore adequate capacity. 
ICAP pays all existing capacity enough to let new entry break even when capacity is 
adequate. Hogan’s energy-only-market approach also tackles the missing money problem 
directly, and solves it by raising the offer cap to something like $10,000/MWh. The cap 
depends on the value of lost load, which is generally estimated to be somewhere between 
$2,000/MWh and $250,000/MWh. 
 
Past energy-only approaches have focused on obligating load to buy more call 
options or long-term energy contracts, and have ignored the missing money problem. The 
approach assumes that a lack of hedging, and not missing money, is the cause of the RA 
problem. Such energy-only approaches provide no mechanism for replacing the missing 
money. Oren (2005), advocating call-option obligations, is helpful in explaining this 
omission.  
 
Spot prices vs. capacity targets. There are two approaches to controlling the resource 
level (installed capacity). The most direct uses a capacity target. For example standard 
ICAP markets use an explicit capacity demand function, which pays investors more than 
enough when the market is short of capacity, and less than enough when it has extra 
capacity. The outcome of a capacity-target approach is relatively predictable. 
 
By contrast, a spot price approach uses an implicit capacity-demand function which 
is nearly impossible to estimate theoretically and can require many years of data to 
estimate empirically. Eighteen years of data from the New England market fails to show 
any relationship between capacity and spot energy prices, and in particular fails to show 
spot energy prices increasing sharply as capacity falls below a target level. 
 
Spot prices as performance incentives.  Economists advocate markets because 
competitive prices provide efficient incentives to both sides of the market. The 
suppression of spot prices, which led to the adequacy problem, dramatically reduced 
hundreds of different performance and investment signals, not just the signal that controls 
the quantity of investment. The obvious solution is to restore the spot prices, but this is 
impractical unless load is fully hedged with call options, which prevent the return of 
market power and risk problems. 
 
Call options do not solve the adequacy problem, or performance, or quality problem. 
They simply allow the use of the market solution to the performance problem while 
protecting consumers from market power and risk. 
 
A complete Basic Design. The design follows the three steps listed above. It builds 
on an energy market, with “normal” and “scarcity” revenues, NR and SR, defined as 
coming from prices below and above the strike price of a call option. 
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Step 1. The scarcity rents of performing capacity suppliers are increased to M × SR. 
Step 2. Load is completely hedged, meaning all suppliers must pay load M × SRShare  
Step 3. A capacity market determines the price, PIC, of hedged capacity. 
 
The scarcity-revenue multiplier, M, restores, in effect, full strength spot pricing. Each 
supplier’s hedge (call option) is responsible for its “Share” of load plus operating 
reserves, which is proportional to its share of total capacity, 10% if it sold 5 out of a total 
of 50 GW. On average, suppliers break even on scarcity revenue, and load pays no 
scarcity revenue directly. Instead load pays the auction price for the hedge against 
scarcity revenues, PIC. The formula for the supplier’s revenue in both markets is: 
 
 [NR  +  SR]  + [PIC   –   SRShare +   (M – 1) ( SR – SRShare ) ] 
 Energy Market    + Capacity Market 
As a direct consequence of these formulas, any supplier that covers its Share of load will 
have SR = SRShare and will receive exactly NR + PIC. The capacity price, PIC, can be set by 
either a short-term or forward capacity market, but a forward market is recommended. A 
supplier that does not supply its share will do worse by M × ( SR – SRShare ). Full-strength 
performance incentives are such that in expectation, for a resource that never performs, 
this deduction exactly offsets the capacity price PIC. 
 
Additions to the Basic Design. The Basic Design simply illustrates key principles, 
and is missing many important practical features. These include (1) market power 
controls in the FCM auction, (2) the descending clock auction, (3) the call options details 
(4) capacity export rules, (5) lumpy supply bid rules, and (6) a definition of capacity. 
 
The final step to convergence. The most advanced designs on the energy-only and 
ICAP design tracks have converged on two fundamental design principles: (1) use 
restored High Spot Prices for performance incentives, and (2) hedge these prices with call 
options. But a fundamental distinction remains between the two tracks. 
 
The ICAP approach requires all supply that receives High Spot Prices to hedge load 
against those prices. The energy-only approach does not. It implements a $10,000 offer 
cap for all load and supply regardless of the hedge. This causes two problems which the 
ICAP approach avoids. (1) As intended, the High Spot Prices dominate the mandatory 
load hedge in the control of the adequate resource level, so this control is erratic. (2) As 
Hogan and Harvey (2000) argued by giving supplier’s market power (now with a $10,000 
price cap instead of the $250 price cap in place at the time), load will be forced to buy 
back this market power when it buys the long-term mandatory hedges of the energy-only 
approach. 
 
Conclusion. The promise of restructuring was not better dispatch, but better 
investment and operation. To date this has not been realized. In fact, with boom-bust 
investment cycles and regulatory risk causing exorbitant risk premiums, consumers may 
be worse off than under the stable environment of regulation. Efficient spot prices held 
out the promise of better investment choices and better operation, but those prices have 
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now been cut to a fraction of their proper level. This has caused the RA problem and 
dramatically diminished signals for investment quality and supplier performance. 
 
By coherently combining the best features of the two RA design tracks, all three of 
these problems can be solved without reintroducing the market power, risk and instability 
problems of the previous High-Spot-Price regime. To accomplish this, first design full-
strength spot prices. Second, restore these High Spot Prices only to suppliers which 
completely hedge load with a call option. Third, purchase an adequate level of hedged 
capacity. Let the market determine how high a price must be paid to induce this adequate 
resource level. 
 
The High Spot Prices will solve the quality and performance problems. The hedge 
will prevent the return of market power and risk problems and will even reduce the 
present level of these concerns. Finally, the capacity market, preferably using a forward 
auction and multi-year contracts for new supply, will provide a stable level of adequate 
capacity and stable energy/capacity prices. This will provide consumers with reliability at 
the lowest cost. 
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3. What Is the Resource Adequacy Problem? 
In a review of older capacity-market initiatives, Bushnell (2005) analyzes six goals of 
resource adequacy mechanisms, but concludes that “Missing from this list is the 
overarching goal of providing reliable electricity service at the lowest possible cost.” 
This is a fair criticism of older energy-only and capacity-market designs and even of the 
recent proposals of Hogan (2005) and Oren (2005), which do not address the problem 
from this perspective. However, the CPUC’s (2005) ICAP proposal states this 
overarching goal explicitly,4 as does PJM’s proposal.5 ISO New England’s recent 
proposal also makes use of it frequently. “Taken together, these features of the proposed 
design will minimize long-run consumer costs, including all costs of generation and the 
cost of possible blackouts from inadequate generation capacity.” (Stoft 2004, p. 9). The 
frequent application of this principle becomes apparent in such phrases as “how to 
minimize those costs by reducing capacity volatility and investor risk” (Stoft 2005, p. 0). 
 
But neither the six goals identified by Bushnell, nor the overarching goal of long-run 
cost minimization, constitute the RA problem. The central problem, labeled “missing 
money,” is that, when generating capacity is adequate, electricity prices are too low to 
pay for adequate capacity. This problem is recognized by all capacity-market approaches 
and by Hogan’s energy-only approach, but not by other energy-only approaches. The 
consequence of this problem is a long-run average shortage of capacity and too little 
reliability. 
 
Considered narrowly, the problem is caused by the low settings of several key 
market-design parameters, such as the offer cap. Initially, most markets were un-capped 
and price spikes over $5000/MWh were observed for several years running in Eastern 
and Midwest markets. During that period, markets with adequate capacity seemed to be 
paying incumbent generation generously enough. In fact, a market with a $10,000 cap 
triggered by any shortage of operating reserves will quite likely pay enough or more. Too 
much reliability is as possible as too little. This raises the broader question of why the 
parameters are set too low and not too high or just right. The problem behind the problem 
is two-fold. Economics provides no easy answer to “what is the correct design,” and 
social pressures have, on balance, favored low prices. 
 
With no clarity regarding design parameters and prices regularly reaching more than 
100 times their normal level, sometimes under questionable circumstances, pressures 
from load overpowered those from suppliers and market designs were modified to 
produce lower prices. Price caps were set at between $250 and $1000/MWh, and ISOs 
learned many ways of mitigating prices. This was not the wrong first step, though some 
excesses have been committed. Lower price caps and some price mitigations solve very 
real problems caused by market power and risk. But, these changes are partial and 
unbalanced, with the result that investors are missing money. 
 
                                                 
4 “The primary purposes of the Commission’s RA requirements are: … (2) to ensure that this investment is 
provided in a way that minimizes total consumer cost of delivered power over the long run.” (CPUC, 2005, 
p. 1) 
5 “Capacity markets should be designed to dampen boom-bust cycles, improve the stability and 
predictability of system adequacy, and minimize costs to consumers.” (Hobbs, 2005.) 
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A full understanding of the RA problem requires that its source be pushed back one 
level further. An explanation is needed for why regulators are in the business of setting 
market parameters that control investment. This complex and contentious issue is 
discussed at length in Section 6, “What the Market Can’t Do.” As indicated in Figure 1 
above, current electricity markets contain Two Demand-Side Flaws which prevent the 
market from solving the reliability problem and hence the investment problem which is 
the other side of the same coin. Figure 1 provides an overview of the complete cause of 
the resource adequacy problem. Two demand-side flaws, which cannot be eliminated for 
some time, cause regulators to intervene. Market power concerns cause this intervention 
to be biased towards low scarcity rents which are obtained by setting parameters such as 
the price cap (PCap) and operating reserve parameters (OpRes) too low for investment 
purposes. This reduces scarcity revenue, resulting in missing money, (as determined at 
that adequate level of capacity), which in turn, discourages investment before the 
adequate level of capacity is reached. This leaves the market in a precarious position. 
Other Market Problems 
( addressed by energy-only ) 
Two Demand-Side Flaws 
Real-time: 1. meters, 2. disconnect 
Market Frictions 
Regulators must set investment 
parameters ( PCap, OpRes ) 
Parameters set too low 
for reliable investment 
Missing Money 
( when investment is adequate ) 
Too Little Investment 
Lack of Reliability 
Periodic Crises 
Market Intervention 
High cost of investing 
Market Power Risk 
Wealth transfers 
Inefficiency 
Poor Incentives for 
Performance 
Investment Quality 
Figure 1.  Causes of Market Problems 
 
Resource Adequacy Problem 
( addressed by ICAP ) 
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Either regulators will intervene, or capacity will fall towards a point at which investment 
would resume. With a price cap of $250, this might require the cap to be reached for 
roughly 400 hours per year, but with the market this tight, a crisis is likely. 
 
The right side of Figure 1 shows two other market problems which have been 
mistaken for the RA problem, particularly in the West. The market power problem can be 
more efficiently solved by long-term contracts than by market-power mitigation, as has 
been argued since before the California crisis by Wolak (2004). Once, the RA problem 
came to prominence, his long-term contract proposal was simply labeled as the solution 
to that problem. As will be discussed in Section 8, “Replacing the Missing Money,” 
Wolak’s long-term contract proposals contain no mechanism for shifting the required 
amount of revenue in the face of low price caps. 
 
The call-option approaches of Oren and of Chao and Wilson are also diagramed on 
the right of Figure 1. These were developed to solve another real problem, investment 
risk. Unlike the long-term contract approach, these were directed at the RA problem from 
the start. Again, they are helpful and even feed into the solution of the RA problem in a 
helpful manner. But, they do not address the central dilemma of that problem, and cannot 
come close to solving it, unless they are coupled with a capacity market type of 
mechanism. 
 
Fortunately, there is no conflict whatsoever between these three approaches to 
solving three different problems. The best solution to the RA problem utilizes long-term 
call options in a long-term capacity market framework. Moreover, this combined 
approach also solves the performance incentive problems created as side-effects of the 
price cap and other parameters being set too low. This paper shows how this combination 
of approaches is best realized. 
 
The missing money is the step in the RA causal chain most easily quantified, and 
doing so serves to put the problem in perspective. How much is missing? The best 
estimate from ISO-NE is that, with adequate capacity, it will have 20 to 25 shortage 
hours per year. During these hours the price might reach $1000, though that does not 
happen automatically until the fifth such hour in a row. At most, this market should 
provide about 25 × (1000 – 100), or $22,500/MW-year in peaker fixed-cost recovery. 
ISO-NE estimates the fixed cost of a new peaker, the cheapest capacity, at roughly 
$95,000/MW-year.6 With a 30,000 MW market, they are missing over $2 billion per year. 
From the investor’s point of view, when capacity is adequate, peakers can expect to cover 
only one quarter of their fixed costs. No one with such expectations will invest. 
 
The CAISO market appears to be similar. Its price caps are four times lower and 
over five times closer to the variable cost of a peaker. So they need five times as many 
shortage hours as New England to reach the same level of fixed-cost recovery. This 
seems unlikely with adequate capacity, so missing money should be expected. Estimates 
for NYISO and PJM have yielded similar result. 
 
                                                 
6 A peaker is used because every system needs peakers and must pay for them on average, and because they 
are easier to calculate required scarcity rents for. For a more complete analysis, see FAQ 1 in the appendix. 
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Those confronted with this problem sometimes reply, “but remember, there may be 
price spikes again like in 2000—2001, and so the average may not be as low as it looks.” 
But the missing money estimates, noted above, are for years with adequate capacity. 
Economics tells us the market will take care of itself and there should be no missing 
money at all. But that assumes installed capacity will be allowed to fall as far as it needs 
to provide suppliers with high prices—regardless of the impact on reliability. The 
missing-money problem is not that the market pays too little, but that it pays too little 
when we have the required level of reliability. 
 
Another response to the missing money problem is, “Just get out of the way and let 
the market take care of it. The problem is simply the result of meddling.” Many have 
taken this seriously, but without success. No coherent workable pure-market solution has 
ever been proposed. As already noted, this point is addressed by the two Demand-Side 
Flaws and discussed in Section 6. 
 
What is required is a mainly-market solution. One in which the market administrator 
selects the adequate level of capacity and designs the market parameters to induce the 
market to provide that level as cheaply as possible. This still leaves the most important 
role to the market, but the administrator must solve the problem of what level of installed 
capacity is adequate, because the markets do not yet have the necessary infrastructure. 
This paper explains how to design such a market and adjust its parameters to solve the 
adequacy problem while maximizing beneficial and minimizing detrimental side effects. 
 
In summary, the resource adequacy problem is the problem of missing money. This 
problem can be traced to price suppression which in turn can be traced back further. 
Inevitably, price suppression has caused other problems as well, most notably, degraded 
performance and investment-quality incentives. 
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4. A Comparison of Ten Approaches 
We now discuss ten approaches to solving the RA problem. Table 1 compares these ten 
with respect to six fundamental design choices. Although these choices cannot be fully 
understood at this point, they are not unintuitive, and it is hoped that this table will assist 
the reader in keeping track of both approaches and choices as they are discussed, and in 
comparing approaches after reading the paper. 
Interpreting Table 1 
The paper argues for selecting a particular option with regard to each of the six 
fundamental choices as follows. 
 
1) Use a capacity target to ensure reliability. 
2) Replace the missing money to induce adequate investment.  
3) Use contracts that cover the early years of a new investment. 
4) Use a contract type that is tied to physical assets.  
5) Use full-strength spot prices as the performance incentive.  
6) Hedge all load from high prices.  
 
Table 1.  A Comparison of 15 Resource Adequacy Markets 7 
 
Reliability 
Targeting
Replace 
Missing 
Money 
Years 
new unit 
covered
Contract 
Type 
Price-Based 
Performance 
Incentives 
Hedge 
Extent & 
Type* 
Energy-Only Design Track 
Wolak: contract adequacy None No 0 Financial Weak Approx. 
Oren: call options None No 0 Physical Weak Approx. 
Chao-Wilson: call options None No Yrs. > 0 Physical Weak Approx. 
Hogan / MISO: energy-only Price Yes 0 Financial Yes Approx. 
Convergent Design Track 
Singh: combined option ICAP Q / P Partial 0 Physical Weak L. Follow
ISO-NE’s LICAP / CPUC Quantity Yes 0 Physical Yes Over 
Bidwell-Henney: call options Quantity Yes 4 Physical Weak Over 
Cramton-Stoft FCM Quantity Yes 4—5 Physical Yes L. Follow
ICAP Design Track 
Current Northeast ICAPs Quantity Yes 0 Physical No No 
CRAM / PJM Proposal Quantity Yes 3 Physical No No 
* “L. Follow” refers to a load-following hedge. “Approx.” means not all load is hedged, but 
sometimes it is over-hedged. “Over” means that more than peak load is hedged at all times. 
 
                                                 
7 Southern California Edison and the “Joint Parties” (2005/04) propose a resource adequacy requirement 
that seems most akin to Wolak’s contract adequacy approach, but with physically based contracts. Bushnell 
(2005) seems aligned with Wolak, as he opposes the ICAP track and does not mention call options. Two 
designs are represented by Hogan / MISO, two by LICAP / CPUC, and three by Current North-East ICAPs.  
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By and large, the energy-only approaches do well with respect to incentives and 
hedging, while the ICAP approaches do well with respect to solving the central RA 
problem. One surprise is that the call-option / long-term contract approaches do quite 
poorly with respect to requiring genuinely long-term contracts. Mostly they suggest 
contracts that expire before a plant can be built, but one may assume they would not 
object to longer terms. 
 
A second surprise is the strength of showings in the Convergent Design Track. 
Moreover, Hogan’s new design (2005) comes close to crossing the line by being the first 
energy-only approach to face up to and solve the missing-money problem. Unfortunately 
it does not yet take a realistic approach to stabilizing investment, so it will perform 
poorly. Nonetheless it provides an important impetus to the move towards convergence. 
 
Oren (2005) moves towards a convergent design from a different direction. He 
recommends a “centralized procurement of backstop call options by the system operator.” 
The CRAM approach, seen in the bottom row, is a forward ICAP market quite similar to 
the one proposed in this paper (Cramton-Stoft FCM). 
 
The convergent design track was actually pioneered by Singh (2000) in his paper 
proposing to combine elements of ICAP and energy only markets by purchasing call 
options in an ICAP market. In summary, the energy-only approach has been strong on 
hedging and the use of spot prices to provide performance incentives, while the ICAP 
approaches have focused on replacing the missing money and targeting an adequate 
quantity. The Convergent design track embraces all of these benefits.   
 
Some Evaluation Details 
Targeting. This factor determines the design track. ICAP designs target quantity, and 
energy-only designs do not. As is explained in Section 9, targeting a capacity quantity, 
especially with a long-term ICAP auction, is a much more reliable way to assure resource 
adequacy than is administratively setting an energy-demand curve.  
 
Money. RA approaches that do not replace the missing money, do not work. The first 
three energy-only approaches claim to be RA or generation adequacy mechanisms, but 
focus instead on the benefits of risk management and market power suppression.  
 
Years. Although energy only approaches specify long-term contracts, this typically 
means less than three years. For example Wolak (2004) specified 75% coverage one year 
in advance with increasing coverage for shorter time periods.  
 
Type. Significantly, the two energy-only approaches with the most sophisticated 
financial analysis, both specify physically based options as the appropriate method of 
inducing investment. All of the ICAP markets use physically-based contracts.  
 
Incentives. Energy-only designs retain the energy price as the sole driver of 
investment. Were they to solve the investment problem, their performance incentives 
would automatically become full strength. This is not true of Bidwell and Henney’s 
ICAP-Option approach, which is why it is downgraded on performance incentives, even 
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though they are sensitive to this issue and agree that spot prices provide the best 
incentives. 
 
Hedging. Even before the California crisis, Wolak was calling for long-term energy 
contracts because they suppress market power. This remains a key benefit of energy-only 
approaches. Hedges also reduce investor risk and the risk premiums they cause 
consumers to pay on all installed capacity, new and old. This sizable benefit is missed by 
traditional ICAP markets, but captured by the new designs. Although Oren and 
Chao/Wilson suggest load following, only Singh and Cramton/Stoft suggest 
implementing options that inherently follow the load. 
 
In summary, ICAP approaches use a capacity target to send a clear adequacy signal 
and they solve the missing-money problem. Hence they solve the basic RA problem. 
Energy-only approaches provide improvements in risk, spot-market power, and 
performance incentives that are entirely overlooked by traditional ICAP approaches. 
Convergent designs combine the strengths of both approaches without sacrificing any 
benefits. Hogan’s new energy-only approach takes a major step towards a convergent 
design, and Oren’s call-option obligations provide further guidance towards a convergent 
design. ICAP designs have recently begun adopting energy-only features, and the FCM 
design presented here completes the convergence. 
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5. Summary of Proposed Solution 
This paper presents a forward capacity market (FCM) approach to assuring resource 
adequacy which was developed, at the request of load, for use by ISO-NE in its post-
LICAP negotiations.8 Along the way it diagnoses the root cause of the adequacy problem, 
the limitations and potentials of a market approach, and demonstrates the importance of 
side-effects. Before embarking on this journey, it may be helpful to glimpse the 
destination. To that end, we begin by sketching, with many details suppressed, the FCM 
approach. 
The Standard Example 
The following Standard Example and exemplary values will be used in an example of the 
FCM and throughout this paper. Imagine a market with generating units, ranging in 
marginal cost up to $100/MWh, and suppose only these types of generation are currently 
available as new capacity. Assume the spot market is capped at $1000/MWh, and that 
when it has adequate capacity, it pays scarcity revenues (meaning the price exceeds $100) 
to peakers of $20,000/MW-year and that the annualized fixed cost of the Benchmark 
peaker is $80,000/MW-year.9 When capacity is near this level, no investor will invest, so 
adequacy is never attained. Such a market cannot, without modification, sustain a reliable 
level of capacity. The proposal described here, a forward-procurement, installed-capacity 
market, FCM, remedies this problem. 
 
                                                 
8 A parallel short-run ICAP market is also presented, which captures the essence of the LICAP proposal. 
9 The “Benchmark peaker” is the cheapest (fixed cost) capacity that the market would build. Although a 
capacity market will induce investment in every viable type of capacity in the correct proportions, the 
Benchmark unit is the most convenient one to use for analysis. See also FAQ 1 in Appendix 2. 
Table 2.  The Standard Example 
Symbol Value Description 
Energy-Market Model 
VCP $100*/MWh Benchmark peaker variable cost 
FCP $80,000/MW-year Benchmark peaker fixed cost 
PCap $1000/MWh Price cap 
SR $20,000/MW-year Scarcity revenue at adequate capacity 
NR varies Normal revenue ( P < VCP ) 
LOLP 3 hour / 10 years Reliability standard 
Forward Capacity Market (FCM) Parameters 
C* 50,000 MW Target capacity 
SRShare varies SR during a particular interval × a supplier’s fraction of C*. 
PIC $80,000/MW-year Installed-capacity price 
M 4 Spot-price magnifier, FCP / SR 
PS $100* Strike price 
* For simplicity this example assumes there are no old peakers with high variable costs. In 
practice, PS would need to be set roughly three times higher. 
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Basic Forward-Capacity-Market Design 
The FCM design specifies that each year, at the end of March, an auction is held, which 
buys enough capacity, existing and new, to provide adequate capacity C* for the year 
starting three years from that date. Existing capacity will be purchased for one year and 
new capacity will be given four-year contracts.10 
 
Both new and existing units will be paid an auction-clearing price, PIC, that will 
generally be set by the need for new capacity. Existing capacity receives this price for 
one year, and new capacity for four years. 
 
To ensure efficient hardware selection by investors and efficient performance of all 
capacity, the contracts include a pay-for-performance mechanism. This mechanism is 
based on High Spot Prices, which are simply a magnified version of actual spot prices. 
These are magnified only above VCP, so only scarcity revenue is magnified. 
Consequently, if the price magnifier is M = 4, a $600 price becomes $100 + 4 × $500 = 
$2,100. The multiplier is set so that the notional prices would be high enough to induce 
adequate capacity in an energy-only market. 
 
Suppliers are paid or charged the notional price only for deviations of output from 
their Share of output and only when the spot price is above the strike price, PS, which is 
set to VCP. This arrangement is identical to a call option of the type described by Oren 
(2005). Since scarcity revenue, SR, is defined relative to the strike price,  
 
Annual payment from the FCM =  PIC  –  SRShare   +   (M – 1) × ( SR – SRShare ) 
 
A supplier’s scarcity-revenue share, SRShare, is simply its fraction of total capacity 
purchased in the FCM times total scarcity revenue earned by all such capacity. Hence, on 
average, SR – SRShare = 0, and the performance term (the call option) causes no net flow 
of revenue between suppliers and load. The un-magnified subtraction of SRShare from PIC 
hedges both suppliers and load against weather-related fluctuations in normal scarcity 
revenues.11 
 
Example: A supplier has sold 10% of all capacity, so this is its share of the load hedge. 
Suppose C* = 50,000 MW and load is 40,000 MW when the price goes above $100 to 
$900 for twenty hours during the year in question. Total SR during this interval will be 
40,000 × ($900 – $100) × 20 = $640,000,000. The share of SR, SRShare, for our supplier is 
then $64,000,000. If the supplier does supply 10% of load (4,000 MW) during this 
interval this is exactly the scarcity revenue, SR, the supplier will earn during this period. 
 
In the present market, the supplier would then earn its normal revenues, NR, below a 
price of $100, plus its scarcity revenue, SR = $64,000,000. In the FCM it would earn in 
addition PIC, but it would have SRShare = $64,000,000 subtracted and the final term 
                                                 
10 Suggestions for the length of contract for new investments generally range from three to five years. This 
paper recommends four, but without prejudice against five. 
11 Hedging of normal scarcity revenues works well even though SRShare is determined by the real-time price 
and most suppliers sell in the day-ahead market. This is because arbitrage keeps the average day-ahead 
price close to the average real-time price. Ordinary (un-magnified) scarcity revenues are also hedged by the 
first subtraction of SRShare, and this also amounts to a call option. 
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involving (M – 1) would be zero. Hence in the FCM it earns NR + PIC instead of NR + 
SR. Scarcity rents have been replaced by the ICAP payment, just as intended. 
 
But what if the supplier produces 1 MW more than its share during the 20 hours of 
$900 energy prices? Its scarcity revenue, SR, will increase by 20 × $800 = $16,000, but 
its SRShare will be unaffected. So it will keep that increase, plus it will gain (M – 1) (SR – 
SRShare) which, with M = 4, comes to 3 × $1600. Its total gain is then 4 × $16,000 for 20 
hours of extra performance. This comes to $3200 for each MWh of output above its 
share. This is exactly as if it had been paid a price of $3300/MWh without a hedge for 
that MW. The first $100 is part of NR, and the rest would be its scarcity revenue with 
High Spot Prices. So the incentive to produce an extra MW is exactly as it would be 
without a low price cap suppressing the spot price. 
 
The shares of all suppliers add up to 100% because they are fractions of the total 
capacity sold. Each supplier is obligated to supply its share of load, hence all together 
they are obligated to supply exactly total load. Because the total amount produced must 
equal the total load, 40,000 MW, if one supplier produces an extra MW, another must be 
producing 1 MW less than its share. Just as a supplier that produces 1 extra MW receives 
an extra $3200/h, so a supplier that produces 1 too few MW will have an extra $3200/h 
deducted from its PIC. Because of this, the load simply pays total NR plus total PIC no 
matter how the various suppliers perform. 
 
The net result is that load has paid suppliers NR + PIC, where PIC has been 
determined by the auction to be the amount needed to induce new investment. This value, 
PIC, has replaced the old scarcity revenue value, SR, which is determined by regulators 
setting price caps and other parameters, and which is typically too low. Hence the market 
has determined the replacement for the regulatory SR value and has thereby correctly 
replaced the missing money. At the same time, suppliers have been given performance 
incentives which are, in this example, four times greater.  If M is correctly selected to 
produce prices that are, in effect, high enough to induce adequate investment, then the 
performance incentives will be full strength. However, if M is too low, this will only 
affect performance incentives and not the level of investment. The auction will still 
assure that PIC induces enough investment to meet the reliability target level. 
 
Beyond this, FCM also hedges both load and suppliers against spot price fluctuations 
due to weather and similar factors. For example if there were 40 hours of $900 prices 
instead of 20, every supplier that provided its share would find that its SR had doubled 
and that its share of total SR, SRShare, had also doubled, with no net effect. This hedging of 
load and generation has exactly the two benefits sought by energy-only approaches 
because the FCM includes the long-term contracts of energy-only approaches. Those 
benefits are (1) spot price market power is suppressed, and (2) investment risk is 
dramatically reduced.  
Benefits of the FCM Design 
The benefits of the forward-capacity-market approach are, 
(1) excellent control of resource adequacy 
(2) coordinated new entry 
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(3) minimum cost of new capacity 
(4) reduced risk premiums (a savings to load) 
(5) a fair price and good retirement signals for existing capacity 
(6) reduced market power in the spot market 
(7) minimal market power in the capacity market 
(8) ideal investment-quality and performance incentives 
(9) a safe and simple path to an energy-only market when that becomes possible 
 
A stable capacity price. Because the average supplier earns exactly PIC and this is 
fixed for the first four years of a plant’s life and stable thereafter, fixed-cost recovery is 
predictable relative to current energy-only markets. This does not mean fixed-cost 
recovery is guaranteed. A supplier with higher fixed costs gets no more and one that fails 
to perform loses its entire ICAP payment through the performance incentive. 
 
Coordinated entry. The forward auction for capacity serves as a coordination 
mechanism to assure that the right quantity of capacity is procured each year. This solves 
the common problem of boom-bust cycles seen in many industries. 
 
Weather risk is eliminated. In a hot year with three times the normal level of scarcity 
revenue, or in a cold year with no scarcity revenue, the average supplier will still earn 
exactly PIC, and load will still pay exactly PIC. This is because both normal scarcity 
revenues and magnified scarcity revenues are completely hedged. 
 
Spot-market power is reduced. Because suppliers no longer profit from weather-
generated price spikes, they also do not profit from price spikes caused by withholding. 
This suppresses most spot market power without the need for mitigation, a standard result 
concerning long-term energy contracts. 
 
Performance incentives save money. The hedge (subtraction of SRShare) is not 
affected by a supplier’s performance, so the supplier feels the full incentive effect of the 
High Spot Prices, which are the same as those in an ideal energy-only market. This is the 
economic gold-standard for performance and investment-quality incentives. In this 
example, the incentives are identical to those of a market capped at $(1000 + 3 × (1000-
100))/MWh, or $3700/MWh. 
 
Restoring market-based performance incentives will save consumers money in the 
short run by not requiring over-payment for under-performing units and in the long run 
by improving performance and reducing the required level of capacity and its cost. Back-
of-the envelope calculations for short-run saving using ISO-NE data appear to be on the 
order of 10 to 20% of PIC, something approaching one-half billion dollars per year. 
Depriving load of this savings, in other words, forcing them to pay full price for 80% 
effective capacity, is both inefficient and unfair. 
 
Capacity markets can fade away. Completely hedging load against spot prices will 
make load far more agreeable to raising price caps and allowing demand response to set 
higher spot prices. On average, SRShare equals SR, so the use of higher actual spot prices 
will cost load nothing, but they will provide better incentives for demand response. As 
demand response improves, spot prices will spend more time at levels above $100, which 
will increase scarcity revenues. As these increase, the incentive multiplier, M, should be 
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decreased proportionally. When scarcity revenues become adequate, $80,000/MW 
instead of $20,000/MW, M will reach one. After that, the spot-price hedge term (–SRShare) 
can be proportionally reduced while watching for increased market power, risk premiums 
and instabilities in the investment cycle. As the spot-price hedge is scaled back, suppliers 
will expect to keep more of their scarcity revenues, and this will reduce their bids. So, PIC 
will fall towards zero. If the energy-only market appears problem-free, the auction can be 
eliminated. None of this will harm existing suppliers who can expect a constant level of 
fixed cost recovery from the combined energy and ICAP markets. 
 
In summary, the proposed forward capacity market is a normal forward capacity 
market with spot prices restored to their proper level but fully hedged. Because load is 
required to purchase an adequate level of capacity, suppliers will receive a price for that 
hedged capacity sufficient to induce them to invest. Consequently, these physically-based 
hedges sell for much more than typical energy-only forward contracts, and thereby 
restore the missing money. 
 
The hedges not only reduce investor risk, which reduces the risk premium paid by 
load, but also greatly reduce spot-market power. Because of this, spot prices can be set 
correctly, which restores the missing performance and investment quality incentives. 
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6. What the Market Can’t Do 
It has long been conjectured that the market could provide the right capacity level for 
reliability if only the regulators did not cap it. This view is the problem behind the 
problem. It is the reason that fifteen years into electricity market design, the investment 
problem remains unsolved. Here are the two opposing perspectives. 
The market cannot operate satisfactorily on its own. It requires a 
regulatory demand for a combination of real-time energy, operating 
reserves, and installed capacity, and this demand must be backed by a 
regulatory pricing policy. Without this reliability policy, the power system 
would under-invest in generation because of the demand-side flaws.12  
(Stoft 2002, p. 108) 
 
The missing money problem created by limiting scarcity pricing provides 
an example of a missing market. There could be a market for reliability, 
but the regulatory constraint prevents its operation. (Hogan 2005, p. 24) 
 
The principal reason for considering an energy-only market approach to 
achieving resource adequacy is the expectation that it would allow market 
incentives, rather than centralized administrative direction, to drive 
investment decisions. … In the words of William Hogan: “A main feature 
of the [energy-only] market would be prices determined without either 
administrative price caps or other interventions…” (Brackets in original.) 
(MISO 2005, p. 5)  
 
There cannot yet be a market for reliability.13 The 
problem is not the regulatory constraint, but is instead a 
problem of missing and expensive infrastructure. There 
has been only a little progress in putting that infrastructure 
in place over the last ten years, and it is unlikely to be 
sufficiently functional for at least ten more. In the mean 
time, we have an RA problem, equivalently a reliability 
problem, that cannot be solved by the market and which 
must be solved by the market administrator. 
 
The notion that the RA problem is due to regulators 
rather than infrastructure is damaging because it leads to 
the prescription to minimize the role of the administrator, 
when it is the administrator that must solve the problem. 
The result is that the administrative parameters controlling resource adequacy are hidden, 
                                                 
12 This is from Part 2 of Power System Economics, which explicitly assumes away market power. With 
market power, the level of investment is determined by the level of market power, and can be above or 
below the optimal level. The Demand-Side Flaws are listed below. 
13 The market-can-do mistake, is not peculiar to Hogan, but is shared by all energy-only approaches and 
some convergent approaches. Oren (2005) ignores his obligation’s quantity parameter, stating: “The only 
design parameter in the proposed call option obligation scheme is the strike price.” 
Two Choices 
Until expensive new 
infrastructure removes at 
least one of two key 
demand-side flaws, 
administrators, like it or 
not, will determine the 
resource and reliability 
level. They can do it with 
eyes closed, as is the 
case in most markets, or 
with a resource adequacy 
program. Those are the 
only choices. 
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disguised, or denied. Consequently these parameters are set without regard for their affect 
on adequacy. The price cap is set on the basis of market power concerns, operating 
reserve limits are based on security criteria—not adequacy, and other key procedures, 
such as out of market purchases, are often not set at all. Together these parameters and 
procedures determine the scarcity price distribution that makes or breaks the profitability 
of investment. Were they to be set generously, the market would over invest. Set as they 
typically are, investors back away from the adequate level of capacity. Investors are fully 
aware of this link, but it is consistently ignored in the process of market design. The 
consequence is a haphazard solution to the RA problem and a nearly inevitable bias 
towards under investment. 
 
The problem of attempting to deny or disguise the administrator’s role can be seen in 
all three of the energy-only approaches—mandatory hedging, call options, and long-term 
contracts. Only the capacity-market approach has recognized the need for an 
administrative solution, and it has been severely criticized for this recognition. 
Unfortunately the bias towards believing the market can solve the reliability problem is 
so strong that almost no progress has been made toward eradicating this belief in the last 
five years. An exception is Joskow and Tirole (2006) who show that, with the assumption 
that any load can either fully react to the real time price or be individually rationed based 
on the real-time price, an efficient market outcome is possible. This efficiency is limited 
by the load’s lack of price responsiveness, but not by any market failure. The result 
suggests that, without full demand response or individual rationing, the market cannot 
achieve efficiency. Because the approach of Joskow and Tirole is difficult, this paper will 
take a different approach. Instead of proving that the present market infrastructure is not 
up to the job, it will challenge those who claim the reverse to show there is a pure market 
solution—one not crucially dependent on administrative input. The authors are offering a 
$1000 prize for the first pure market design that would work within the following 
extremely simple market structure.14   
 
This challenge is posed for a drastically simplified market, and relies on the 
following principle. If, with nearly every stumbling block removed, no purely market-
based solution can be found, then the claim for such a solution must be dropped. If the 
market cannot solve the easiest textbook problem, it cannot solve the vastly more difficult 
one presented by the real world. 
 
Consider an electricity market consisting of two types of generators, baseload and 
peakers, and hundreds of suppliers with no market power.15 There is a demand function 
that moves left and right at 2 GW per hour with a 4 pm peak of 44 MW on all but 10 hot 
days when it peaks at 50 GW. Between the prices of $100 and $500 the demand curve is 
elastic and demand declines by 1 GW. Lack of real-time metering prevents more 
elasticity, and consumers cannot be disconnected individually in real time. Consumers 
have an average value of lost load of $100,000/MWh.  
                                                 
14 Send proposed solutions to the authors. Useless solutions such as “have the administrator invent zero-
cost capacity” will not be accepted.  
15 Peakers are assumed to have a fixed cost of $80,000/MW-year and a variable cost of $100/MWh. 
  22   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The administrator of this market cannot read minds and so does not know VOLL. 
She must set up Hogan’s market for reliability, and the market must then provide, in 
equilibrium, the correct level of investment to achieve the reliability that consumers want. 
The puzzle is, can she do this, and if so how? To be convincing, any market design 
claimed as a solution must be accompanied by a calculation of the equilibrium capacity 
level to show that it equals the optimal level for reliability, which is 48,922 MW.16 
 
Note that this market is free of every flaw that is normally said to cause the RA 
problem and every flaw normally said to trigger regulatory intervention. There is no 
meddling regulator. It has no price caps, offer caps, market-power mitigation, and no 
market power. No ancillary services are needed. Generation is not lumpy. There is never 
congestion. Demand is 100% predictable. LSEs have no market power and are free to 
enter forward contracts, and there is more than the usual demand elasticity. 
 
The answer to this puzzle, and the challenge to market designers, is this claim: The 
administrator cannot avoid regulatory constraints and let the market determine the correct 
                                                 
16 The optimal capacity level is calculated by analyzing a well designed market with administrative price 
setting. Whenever the supply and demand curves fail to intersect (a market failure so gross it is not 
analyzed in any economics text), the price should be set by the administrator to $100,000/MWh to reflect 
the best interests of consumers. Peakers will earn between $0 and $400/MWh in fixed cost recovery for one 
hour (half an hour on the way up and half an hour on the way down) on hot days. This will result in 
$2,000/MW-year of fixed cost recovery out of $80,000 needed. Consequently $7,800/MW per hot day must 
be recovered from VOLL pricing. This requires 0.078 hours of VOLL per hot day. With demand shifting at 
2 GW per hour, demand must exceed supply by 78 MW at the peak. Hence the optimal capacity level is 
50,000MW minus 1,000 MW of demand elasticity minus 78 MW of uncovered demand = 48,922 MW of 
capacity. 
Supply 
Demand Price 
Quantity 
Figure 2.  “The Market” Cannot Find the Reliable Quantity of Capacity 
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level of reliability. It is impossible. Not only is it impossible, but no pure-market design 
can be demonstrated to guide the investment level to any level near the optimal capacity 
level. All pure market designs for the described market fail utterly, because they can 
obtain no hint of consumer’s preferences regarding reliability. The market has no way of 
finding that VOLL is not $500 or is not $5,000,000/MWh. Every pure market design 
leaves the market clueless concerning the optimal level of reliability. 
 
Of course, this market is flawed. In an unflawed market the answer would be 
extremely simple, either (1) just allow bilateral trading, or (2) just collect the bids, set 
price by intersecting the supply and demand curves, and send out the bills. Disconnect 
those who do not pay. 
 
Since all other flaws have been eliminated, the lack of a market solution must be due 
to the two Demand-Side Flaws, which are present in this example and will be present in 
real markets for several years to come.   
 
Demand-Side Flaws (Stoft 2002, p. 15) 
 
Flaw 1:  Lack of metering and real-time billing 
Flaw 2:  Lack of real-time central control of power flow to specific customers 
 
Elimination of either flaw would allow the investment problem to be solved, but the 
solution differs depending on the flaw eliminated. To understand why these two flaws 
block the two possible solutions, a deeper understanding of the investment problem is 
required. 
 
In normal markets of all kinds, when there is too little productive capacity, prices are 
high. When there is too much capacity, prices are low. Since high prices encourage 
investment and low prices discourage it, commodity prices control investment. 
Economics shows that in competitive markets, commodity prices, electricity prices in the 
present case, will signal the right level of investment and the right, or adequate, level of 
installed capacity. 
 
But what does “right level of capacity” mean in a normal market? It does not mean 
optimal reliability, because normal markets have no reliability problem. They are 
perfectly reliable. In a normal market, price keeps supply and demand equal and the 
markets are much less fragile. In a normal market, the supply curve always intersects the 
demand curve. The right level of capacity is the level that makes the marginal value of 
product to consumers equal the long-run marginal cost of production. No economics text 
will explain how a market sets capacity to the adequate level for reliability, because 
normal markets cannot do that and do not need to.  
 
One way to solve the reliability problem would be to eliminate it the way it is 
eliminated in a normal market—by having price equilibrate supply and demand. In a 
power market, this would mean that when the ISO needed to shed load, as it now does in 
a rolling blackout, it would simply step the price up by perhaps $500/MWh, and this 
would trigger quick load reductions by large consumers who would have price-controlled 
circuit breakers or other quick-response methods. Since these consumer actions would be 
voluntary, this is not involuntary load shedding. This represents the elimination of Flaw 
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#1 and the development of sufficient demand elasticity. This is the most desirable 
market-based solution to the reliability problem—market-provided perfect reliability.17 
As demand elasticity increases, so will reliability and at some point we will be close 
enough to drop the concept of planned reserves, but not for a while. (See also FAQ 8 in 
Appendix 2.) 
 
The other way to solve the problem, which is less efficient and requires more 
capacity, is to use the market to induce load to buy excess capacity. This would be a true 
reliability market. This way, the reliability problem still exists, and there is still highly-
inefficient, involuntary load shedding. When load shedding is required, the customers 
with insufficient energy contracts, or with contracts whose suppliers are not performing, 
are cut off.  
 
An actual reliability market requires even more infrastructure. To cut off individual 
customers with inadequate contracts, the ISO must know everyone’s contract position, 
and which units they are contracted with, and must have the ability to cut them off by 
remote control without affecting their neighbor. This will induce all customers to 
purchase long-run contracts up to the point where the cost of more contract cover is no 
longer worth the extra reliability they gain.18 
 
Joskow and Tirole (2006) show that such a scheme could produce an efficient 
reliability market, but could this possibly be what Hogan and other energy-only 
advocates have in mind when they say “There could be a market for reliability but the 
regulatory constraint prevents its operation.” (Hogan 2005, p. 24) Could the regulatory 
constraint they complain of be preventing a market for individual reliability levels 
provided by remote-controlled individual blackouts? It does not seem possible that 
energy-only advocates have this in mind. Instead, they must be imagining one of the 
energy-only designs in which all customers receive the same reliability level. 
 
But an efficient market for uniform reliability is even more impossible than an 
efficient market for individual reliability. The later could be achieved with new 
sophisticated market infrastructure. But an efficient market for uniform reliability is 
impossible no matter what the infrastructure. If reliability is not individualized then 
individuals know that they will not receive less reliability if they pay less for it, because 
they can be given less only if everyone is given less. Consequently, everyone will refuse 
to pay for collective reliability and all will attempt to enjoy a free ride. 
 
An important point concerning any reliability market is that end-use customers, and 
not LSEs, must decide their own contract level. That is the only legitimate market signal 
for reliability. If LSE’s are deciding, they will base their decisions not on consumer 
preferences but on the penalties that will be imposed by regulators if they provide too 
                                                 
17 Perfect reliability in the context of the adequacy problem means that there will be no blackouts caused by 
inadequate installed capacity. It does not mean lightning will never strike a power line and put your lights 
out. 
18 For completeness, a related solution, still blocked by Flaw 2, would be to have LSEs choose their 
reliability level, and customers chose their LSE on the basis of the reliability and cost. This is impossible 
because neighbors cannot yet be given different reliability levels even if they sign up with different LSEs. 
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little reliability. That would leave central administrators, and not the market, in charge of 
the reliability and capacity levels. 
 
In summary, perfect reliability (with regard to the adequacy problem) could be 
achieved by eliminating Flaw 1. An individual reliability market could be achieved by 
eliminating Flaw 2. An efficient uniform reliability market, as promised by energy-only 
advocates, cannot be achieved under any circumstances. Consequently, the market 
administrator will determine the level of installed capacity either inadvertently or with a 
resource-adequacy program. At this time, there is no other choice.  
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7. The “Energy-Only” Approach 
There is no pure market solution to the RA problem, yet energy-only approaches and 
long-term-contract approaches frequently imply that they are just that, pure-market 
solutions, perhaps with a few administrative features in the ancillary service market 
(Hogan 2005).19 This discrepancy in claims deserves a clear resolution. Fortunately the 
clarity of Hogan’s 2005 paper, “On an ‘Energy Only’ Electricity Market Design for 
Resource Adequacy,” provides a unique opportunity to resolve this debate. 
 
Hogan’s paper advances the view that a capacity-market approach would overturn 
the electricity market while an energy-only approach could and should leave major 
economic decisions surrounding investment to be voluntarily arranged by the parties. In 
other words, its central claim is that a market, free of central control, can solve the RA 
problem if an energy-only approach is used, while a capacity approach will overturn the 
market by allowing a central administrator to make the major economic decisions 
surrounding investment. 
 
This is not correct. An energy-only approach can use the market to solve every part 
of the resource adequacy problem except one—adequacy. The adequacy part of the 
adequacy problem is the elephant in the room that energy-only approaches never address 
head on—because current markets cannot tell us how much capacity is needed for 
adequate reliability. It’s not that an energy-only market will not procure adequate 
capacity; the problem is that they must be designed specifically to procure adequate 
capacity, and the design parameters, must be set by a central authority—not the market. 
The planners must adjust the energy demand curve to make the market buy an adequate 
level of capacity rather than an inadequate or superfluous level of capacity. The market 
cannot adjust the all-controlling design parameters. 
The Centrally-Planned Energy-Only Demand Curve 
Hogan presents an energy+reserve demand curve, which is controlled at every relevant 
point by three parameters which appear to be well planned but which did not come from 
any market, the price cap of $10,000/MWh and two operating-reserve parameters of 3% 
and 7%. These three parameters do not just fine tune the demand curve; they entirely 
control the missing money problem which is the central determinate of adequacy. These 
three parameters control the fixed cost recovery of peakers, roughly $80,000 per MW-
year of capacity, and consequently they control this amount of revenue for every MW of 
capacity in the system.20 In a 50,000 MW system, that comes to $4 billion per year (with 
the parameters set properly) controlled by the centrally-planned parameters. Depending 
on how these parameters are set, the resource level, in other words the level of installed 
                                                 
19 “Similarly, the emphasis on an “energy only” market does not mean that there would be nothing but spot 
deliveries of electric energy with a complete absence of administrative features in the market. Since the 
technology of electricity systems does not yet allow for operations dictated solely by market transactions 
with simple well defined property rights, the system requires some rules to deal with the complex 
interactions in the network. To the contrary, there would of necessity be an array of ancillary services and 
associated administrative rules for such services.” (Hogan, 2005, p. 9) 
20 Peaker fixed cost (for a Frame unit) is diversely estimated at between $60,000 and $95,000/MW-year. 
The value of $80,000 is used throughout this paper because it is convenient and plausible. 
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generating capacity, will gravitate towards a level that leaves California with anywhere 
from one rolling blackout in 100 years to 10 rolling blackouts per year and even more 
extreme results could be achieved. These three parameter, determine whether resources 
will be inadequate, adequate or superfluous, and these three parameter are not and cannot 
be determined by the market. They are and will be determined by a central administrator. 
Markets can determine prices, but not price caps. Markets cannot determine what level of 
operating reserves should be required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3, a reproduction of Hogan’s Figure 5, shows how the planning parameters 
control the multi-billion dollar flow of scarcity revenues to investors. Suppose that, if the 
price were $30, energy demand by consumers would equal R shown in Figure 3. Had the 
operating reserve parameters been set to 0%, the price would be $30, as shown by the 
lower demand curve. With Hogan’s parameters, the price would have just reached 
$10,000. With CAISO’s demand-curve parameter it might be $250, and with East-coast 
parameters it might be $1000. This price affects all generation, so $10,000 translates into 
roughly $500,000,000 (half a billion) per hour. These centrally-set parameters are no 
small part of the energy-only design. 
 
Some will argue that load and suppliers will sign long-term contracts which will be 
unaffected by these real-time prices. They will argue that only perhaps 2% of supply 
should be un-hedged, so the actual revenue transfer at such times is only $10 million per 
hour. This is entirely misleading. Even if such a level of long-term contracting does 
Q(MW) 
$20,000 
$10,000 
Illustrative Energy + Reserve Demand 
Central Planning 
Decisions 
3% 
7% 
R 
Energy plus reserve demand defines the demand for 
generation operating capacity.
Energy + 
Reserves 
$30 
P ($/MWh) 
Figure 3.  Hogan’s “Figure 5” from “On an ‘Energy Only’ Electricity Market” 
Not in original: “Central Planning Decisions,” “R”, blue arrows.
Note that the starting demand curve (solid black line) has already been heavily modified by the central 
planner’s choice of a $10,000 cap, and this diagram illustrates additional modifications at lower prices.
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materialize, the cost impact on load and the revenue impact on generation will be exactly 
what it appears to be considering only real-time prices. This is because the price of 
forward contracts is affected by real-time prices. Forward prices reflect expected day-
ahead prices, and day-ahead prices reflect real-time prices. If real-time prices are 
expected to rise to $10,000/MWh for an average of 5 hours per year, then a forward 
contract for a year of base-load power will cost $49,500/MW-year more than if spot price 
are never expected to rise above $100/MWh. Forward contracts hedge risk, but they do 
not cause suppliers to sell power at far less than the expected spot price. If either party 
sees that spot prices would be much more favorable to them than buying a forward 
contract, they will not sign the forward contract. Hence forward contracts reflect spot 
prices. 
 
Finally, consider the parameters themselves. The 7% value for operating reserves is 
essentially an engineering value. Engineers were setting this for years before there were 
any electricity markets to speak of, and they do a good job of it. This parameter is not set 
by the market. But, what matters more is how rapidly price climbs when the 7% 
requirement is not met. Often there are proposals to calculate the appropriate price based 
on the chance of a blackout, and the value to load of not being blacked out. But neither of 
these inputs is determined by the market. The most crucial parameter is the value of lost 
load (VOLL). This value is often proposed for the price cap. The central reason an 
energy-only approach cannot use the market to determine adequacy is that the market 
cannot determine VOLL, and VOLL is the main determinant of how much capacity is 
needed to provide consumers with their desired reliability tradeoff. VOLL is the average 
value placed by consumers on losing power in an average rolling blackout. This average 
is notoriously hard to estimate, but that difficulty is not the point. The point is that it must 
be estimated, because the market does not and cannot determine it. Such estimates are 
performed by academics or planners, not markets. Planners compute a value that they 
believe reflects society’s needs because the current markets cannot determine the need for 
reliability. Of course they will take account of certain market data, regulators always do. 
But just because a regulator relies on his or her observations of the market when setting 
prices does not mean we have a free market. If the regulator sets the price, it is a 
regulated market.21 It is unfortunate that the market does not determine VOLL, but it does 
not. 
Central Planning of Quantity Leaves Room for the Market 
Why did Professor Hogan recommend a centrally-planned method of securing adequate 
resources? Because he had no choice. There is no pure-market approach that makes 
sense. Nonetheless, markets have a tremendously important role to play in securing 
adequate capacity. They are needed to assure the low cost, high quality and performance 
of the capacity purchased. The market can select who should build, where plants should 
be built, the proportion of base-load plants; it can determine how many peakers should be 
super-quick-start aero derivatives, whether they should be dual fuel, and much more. It 
                                                 
21 The exception, which has caused much confusion, is an auction. The auctioneer (ISO) sets a price based 
entirely on bids and not on his own judgment. Consequently, an auction is the one case of a pure market 
price set by a (highly constrained) central administrator. There is no process remotely like an auction for 
determining VOLL.  
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can solve problems we are not even aware of when we design the market. In short, 
markets can do all the really difficult things that we need markets to do. They simply 
cannot tell us how much capacity we need because we never tell the market how much 
reliability we are willing to pay for. Markets are amazing coordinators, but they do not 
read minds. 
 
Hogan is not alone in relying on central planning. Centrally determined obligations 
control capacity investment under Oren’s energy-only proposal. 
“Once the target quantities of generation capacity are determined by 
engineering considerations that quantity is allocated as a prorated 
obligation to the load serving entities.” (Oren 2005, p. 2) 
Any wholesale customer or LSE should be required to carry call options 
that will cover its peak load … plus adequate reserves as set by the 
regulator. (Oren 2005, p. 6) 
The energy-only approach is advertised as the pure market-approach because its non-
market mechanisms tend to be overlooked, and because the slogan “it’s the market 
approach” is somehow persuasive. If there were a pure market approach, that might 
decide the question. Since there is not, we must look deeper. In fact there are several 
distinct approaches that utilize the markets to make almost all the decisions except the 
decision of what is the adequate resource level. 
 
To chose between these approaches, we must look at their performance in several 
dimensions. Although all can hit any desired adequacy target on average, some will miss 
the target by more on both the high and low side. Some will raise risk premiums more 
than others, a problem that could easily cost consumers dearly. Market power is an 
equally important consideration. Simplicity and durability are also crucial. 
 
In selecting an approach, there is one pitfall to avoid above all others. If a design is 
picked that appears to allow the market to determine adequacy, it will almost certainly 
fail. That is because the market cannot determine what is adequate, and such a design will 
inhibit the necessary regulatory determination because the levers of control will be 
obscure. That has led to an absence of any coherent control of adequacy in the past, and 
is likely to lead to disaster in the future. Better to admit the regulator has a hard and 
necessary job and face the task squarely. As will be demonstrated shortly, this is not such 
a formidable assignment—partly because we know a fair amount about what is adequate, 
and partly because a 5% error in targeting causes less than a 1% retail cost increase. Even 
a good market could not do much better—there is just not that much room for 
improvement. What is important is not to leave adequacy to chance and not to cause 
damaging side effects by preventing the market from doing what we need it to do—
control quality and performance. 
 
In summary, the energy-only approach relies on an administratively determined 
energy+reserve demand curve to control scarcity revenues, investment, and capacity 
level. It is no less centrally planned than the ICAP approach. 
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8. Replacing the Missing Money 
The central problem of resource adequacy was defined above as missing money. This has 
been documented by all of the Eastern ISOs, which explains their continued use of 
capacity markets designed primarily to replace missing revenues. Perhaps Joskow has 
made the most systematic study of this problem. 
On the one hand, a market response that leads prices (adjusted for fuel 
costs) and profits to fall and investment to decline dramatically when there 
is excess capacity, is just the response that we would be looking for from a 
competitive market. … At least some of the noise about investment 
incentives is coming from owners of merchant generating plants who 
would just like to see higher prices and profits. On the other hand, 
numerous analyses of the performance of organized energy-only 
wholesale markets indicate that they do not appear to produce enough net 
revenues to support investment in new generating capacity in the right 
places and consistent with the administrative reliability criteria that are 
still applicable in each region. (Joskow 2006, p. 15) 
Joskow has not forgotten that oversupply leads to low prices, yet he still reports that 
“wholesale markets … do not appear to produce enough net revenue,” and he is including 
revenue from ICAP markets as well as energy markets. 
However, even adding in capacity revenues, the total net revenues that 
would have been earned by a new plant over this six year period would 
have been significantly less than the fixed costs that investors would need 
to expect to recover to make investment in new generating capacity 
profitable. This phenomenon is not unique to PJM. Every organized 
market in the U.S. exhibits a similar gap between net revenues produced 
by energy markets and the fixed costs of investing in new capacity 
measured over several years time (FERC (2005), p. 60; New York ISO 
(2005), pages 22-25). There is still a significant gap when capacity 
payments are included. (Joskow 2006 p. 16). 
What is the proximate cause of these shortfalls? For our purposes, the relevant ones are 
those that depress energy market revenues, and Joskow provides the most complete list. 
The problems include: [1] price caps on energy … [2] market power 
mitigation mechanisms that do not allow prices to rise high enough during 
conditions when generating capacity is fully utilized … [3] actions by 
system operators that have the effect of keeping prices from rising fast 
enough and high enough to reflect the value of lost load … [4] reliability 
actions taken by system operators that rely on Out of Market (OOM) calls 
on generators that pay some generators premium prices but depress the 
market prices paid to other suppliers, … [5] payments by system operators 
to keep inefficient generators in service due to transmission and related 
constraints rather than allowing them to be retired or be mothballed, … [6] 
regulated generators operating within a competitive market that have poor 
incentives to make efficient retirement decisions, depressing market prices 
for energy. (Joskow 2006, p. 17) 
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Although the missing money problem has been widely recognized in the Northeast, it 
has not been recognized frequently in the rest of the country. Two recent exceptions are 
the CPUC’s August 2005 Report and Hogan’s report to the CAISO. 
The primary purposes of the Commission’s RA requirements are: (1) to 
ensure sufficient incentives for new electric infrastructure investment, and 
maintenance of necessary existing generation, by providing a revenue 
stream that is missing from today’s capped energy markets to compensate 
generation owners for their fixed costs.  (CPUC 2005, p. 1) 
 
The missing money problem arises when occasional market price 
increases are limited by administrative actions such as price caps. … these 
administrative actions reduce the payments that could be applied towards 
the fixed operating costs … The resulting missing money reduces the 
incentives to maintain plant or build new generation facilities. (Hogan 
2005, p. 1) 
The most convincing study may have been done by ISO-NE which went back 18 
years to look at shortage hours (see Figure 6). Given the ISO’s real-time pricing policies, 
there were not enough shortage hours in any of those 18 years to cover the fixed costs of 
a peaker. Because the missing money problem is central to resource adequacy, it is worth 
looking closely at the two ways it can be solved, with capacity obligations and with high 
spot prices, and at why other approaches do not attempt to solve it. 
The ICAP Approach 
The simplest way to replace the missing money is the classic capacity market. All load is 
required to buy its proportional share of capacity credits so that the total capacity 
purchased equals the adequacy target. All installed capacity is allowed to sell capacity 
credits equal to its nameplate capacity. This is enforced by charging load something like 
$150,000 per MW-year of shortfall below its capacity requirement. If there is less than 
adequate capacity, some load will inevitably fall short and be fined. Suppliers, 
recognizing the need of load to avoid fines, will raise the price of their capacity credits to 
$150,000/MW-year, so even though the market is only a little short of capacity and only 
a little money is paid in fines, all capacity will receive a price of $150,000/MW-year. 
This is the result of the law of one price (Jevons 1879).22 Whenever the market is short of 
capacity, investors will find investment profitable, and this will bring installed capacity 
up to the target level. If it exceeds the target, the price (barring market power) will fall to 
zero and investment will cease.23 Capacity payments will average something between $0 
and $150,000/MW-year and their actual average will be just enough to restore the 
missing money and make investors whole. 
                                                 
22 “In the same open market, at any moment, there cannot be two prices for the same kind of article.” From 
The Theory of Political Economy. 
23 Actually, the investment process is rather more complex because investors build on the basis of 
anticipated ICAP payments as well as other revenues and costs over the life of the plant. 
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Hogan’s Energy-Only Approach 
Hogan adopts the spot-price approach to restoring the missing money. He suggests 
raising the offer-cap in the spot market to something like $10,000/MWh, and requiring 
the ISO to raise spot prices towards this level as operating reserves fall in real time. So, 
with operating reserves of about 5%, the spot price might reach $5,000/MWh. This will 
certainly increase the average level of installed capacity. If the administratively 
determined energy demand curve is properly designed, it will induce on average the same 
target capacity that the ICAP approach induces. Determining what parameters will induce 
what capacity level is not as easy as it is with the capacity approach. 
 
If, at the adequate level of capacity, the demand curve causes spot prices that are 
high enough on average for a peaker to just cover its fixed costs, then to a good 
approximation, the market will induce the right level of installed capacity. For the 
administrator to set the demand parameters correctly, it is necessary to calculate the 
distribution of price spikes that will be induced by load fluctuations, generator outages, 
and transmission outages. This is quite a difficult calculation. First one must calculate the 
target capacity level, just as in the ICAP approach, and then, for that level, one must 
compute the frequency and duration of shortage events that occur for only a few hours 
per year and depend on extremely unusual and anomalous conditions. 
 
But Hogan argues against this indirect route, and for what he calls “the direct 
determination of the willingness to pay for operating reserves.” The flat part of the curve 
would be determined by the administrative estimate of VOLL, but the steeply sloped part 
at the right, should be determined by the benefit of operating reserves. 
If the operating reserve demand curve captures the value of reliability, the 
resulting expected equilibrium loss of load probability should be the 
standard. This stands in contrast to an alternative approach that would fix 
the installed capacity requirement and determine the operating reserve 
demand to produce enough revenue to support investment that would meet 
the installed capacity target. … The indirect route of specifying the 
expected loss of load probability [which is how the capacity target is 
determined] should not replace the direct determination of the willingness 
to pay for operating reserves. (Italics added.) (Hogan 2005, p. 22) 
This approach requires the administrator to directly determine the willingness of 
consumers to pay for operating reserves. The market will not directly determine this, as 
consumers do not shop for operating reserves. Consequently, the determination will 
necessarily be made by a market administrator (with help from an engineer) who will 
capture the value of reliability which is determined from the administratively determined 
estimate of VOLL. Unfortunately, even if the administrative determination of VOLL 
were completely accurate, determining the value of operating reserves would still need to 
rely on a theory of valuing reserves not yet developed. 
 
The direct approach requires the administrator to determine VOLL. Some idea of the 
difficulty of this determination can be gained from the results obtained in the past. 
Bushnell (2005) tells us that “Most surveys put the ‘value of lost load’ between 
$2000/Mwh and $50,000/Mwh.” Hogan suggests the geometric mean of the range, 
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$10,000/MWh, but engineers seem to have a different view. Their view may simply be 
wrong, or it may implicitly account for some intuitive concern about the danger of 
cascading outages when the system is short of supplies. Their estimate can be backed out 
of their required loss of load probability, one event in 10 years, the estimated length of 
the event, three hours, and the fixed cost of a new peaker, $80,000/MW-year. The 
required relationship is: 
 
 FCP   =   Blackout Hours per Year  ×  VOLL.  
which implies the engineering VOLL = ($80,000/MW-year) / (0.3 h/year), which is 
$266,666/MWh. 
 
Whether the more practical indirect approach is used to administratively determine 
the energy demand curve, or the administrator uses Hogan’s method of direct 
determination, the spot-price approach will restore enough missing money to induce a 
higher level of installed capacity. With the indirect approach, it should induce a resource 
level near the standard reliability-based capacity target, and with the direct approach, 
some level implied by the administrator’s estimate of VOLL and the operating reserve 
parameters. 
Other Energy-Only Approaches Ignore the Missing Money 
Generally, energy-only approaches simply ignore the missing money problem for one of 
two reasons. They either assume that it will be fixed by the regulator, for example by the 
CPUC, or they propose an alternative cause of the missing money that requires no special 
attention by the RA mechanism. Consider first the role of the regulator. 
 
Under an energy-only approach that specifies an obligation on the part of load to 
purchase options, the PUC could play one of two roles. It could either specify a 
obligation level for each LSE and a penalty for failing to meet the obligation, or it could 
simply purchase the options itself and force the LSEs to pay for their shares. Assuming 
that in the first case the PUC has set the penalty high enough to force compliance, there 
will be no difference in the quantity of options purchased and no difference in the price 
paid between the two methods.24 Because of the equivalence of these two approaches, 
and because bilateral contracting is frequently assumed, we will discuss the energy-only 
proposals under the assumption that a penalty will be imposed for non-compliance.25  
 
When an energy-only approach fails to give any guidance on the need for penalties 
or discourages their use in favor of simply emphasizing the benefits of options, the PUC 
may conclude that penalties are unnecessary and choose to avoid them entirely. But this 
can only result in resource adequacy by coincidence, and the studies by Joskow and the 
Eastern ISOs imply such a coincidence would be entirely unexpected. A zero penalty—
                                                 
24 This ignores transaction cost and market power differences, which are second order effects, and likely 
more problematic under a bilateral approach. Even if a more general penalty structure is required, it can be 
accomplished with either approach. For example, if the PUC has determined that it will purchase 50 GW if 
the option price is $X but only 49 GW if it is $2X, it could achieve the same outcome in a bilateral market 
by imposing a penalty of $X on LSEs that did not buy their share of 50 GW, and of $2X on LSEs that did 
not buy their share of 49 GW. 
25 In contrast, ISO-NE and PJM will actually purchase the forward contracts and charge each LSE its share. 
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that is, no enforcement of the obligation—is appropriate only if the combination of price 
caps, operating reserve payments, and load duration curve results in covering the fixed 
costs of a peaker when the capacity is at the level deemed adequate for reliability. 
 
By failing to give guidance on the target and penalty, the actual solution of the 
adequacy part of the RA problem is sidestepped and left to the regulator. For example, 
suppose $60,000/MW-year is missing at the target level of capacity. If the regulator 
chooses a non-compliance penalty of $20,000/MW-year, LSEs will fail to meet their 
obligation even though the energy-only approach is carried out to the letter. In other 
words, if option strike prices are selected appropriately and obligations are targeted 
correctly, that does not guarantee a solution to the adequacy problem, without a proper 
penalty structure. 
 
Alternatively, energy-only approaches may be implicitly assuming that the regulator 
will set an obligation level and use an extremely high penalty, such as $600,000/MW-
year in the above example. Admittedly, we see no indication of this in the penalty 
language of the reviewed papers. However, this would fit with the view that the regulator 
does not need any economic advice regarding how to achieve an adequate capacity level. 
The regulator would simply have the engineers set the target and then enforce the 
purchase of physical options, up to that level, with a penalty that was sure to induce 
compliance. Unfortunately, as Chao and Wilson (2004) and Hogan and Harvey (2000) 
point out, forcing load into high levels of forward contracting shifts market power from 
the spot market to the forward market. An extremely high penalty backing an imposed 
vertical demand curve could cause severe problems. If the requirement includes a lead 
time of three to four years as in the ISO-NE design, market power in the forward market 
will be mitigated by new entry, but as discussed later, market power problems are non-
trivial even in this case. 
 
Energy-only designs without High Spot Prices have so far failed to address the 
economic mechanism by which adequacy is achieved. Instead Chao and Wilson (2004) 
and others provide valuable insights into how to manage risk in the investment market 
and how to control market power in the spot market without interventionist mitigation 
measures. Both of these insights should be applied to any RA design. 
 
Although some authors leave the targeting and enforcement of obligations as a detail 
for the regulator, still others ignore or minimize this issue, because they propose a 
different cause for the investment shortfall, other than missing money. Unlike the 
documentation of the missing-money problem by the Northeast ISOs, and by Joskow, 
these other causes are not well documented.  
 
Other contributions to the energy-only design track include Wolak (2004) focusing 
on the importance of long-term contracting, Chao and Wilson (2004) focusing on options 
and risk management, and Bidwell (2005), Bidwell and Henney (2004), and Oren (2005) 
focusing on options. The authors make helpful contributions by highlighting some 
element of the resource adequacy problem and some part of the solution, but generally 
the approaches pay little attention to the possibility that spot-prices are systematically too 
low. 
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The contract adequacy approach 
The contract adequacy approach imposes a regulatory requirement on load to purchase 
long-term energy contracts. It was originally developed as a method of controlling market 
power and serves that purpose better than the more popular market mitigation measures.26 
In more recent years it has also been proposed as a method for assuring resource 
adequacy, but this requires a fresh analysis. 
 
Proponents of this approach hold that the source of the investment problem is not 
missing money but the lack of long-term contracts for new investors. Call this the 
missing-contract problem. In other words, if a new investor could lock in the expected 
spot price for some years in advance of construction, the investor would be willing to 
build in today’s market. In contrast, missing money refers to low spot prices and not to a 
failure to lock in spot prices with a long-term contract. The following is one explanation 
of the missing-contract view. 
So how do the successful markets described earlier ensure that sufficient 
generation capacity is available to meet current and future demand without 
a capacity market? They do it the same way as other industries … through 
an active forward market. For example, jet aircraft and jet aircraft engines 
are typically sold on a forward market, far in advance of the delivery date. 
(Wolak 2004, p. 4) 
This explanation asserts that other industries that require long-term capital investments 
rely on long-term forward contracts for their products as the basis for building production 
capacity. A host of common examples argue otherwise. Hotels can be more expensive 
than most generators, yet few rooms are booked before an investor breaks ground on a 
new Hotel. General Motors sells no long-term contracts for cars before it builds the 
factory to produce them. Chip manufactures build chip fabricating plants before the chips 
are even designed let alone sold. Long-term investments are rarely financed on the basis 
of long-term product sales; and long-term investments are often made in industries that 
sell almost all of their product only a month or two in advance.  
 
Why do investors in other industries invest in assets with lives of 10 to 60 years 
when they have sold none of the output from their investment? Because, they expect to 
sell product at profitable prices. Investments are almost always based primarily on 
expectations, not on the basis of locked-in forward contracts. 
 
This makes expectations crucial, and the electricity industry has a special problem 
with investor expectations because of regulatory risk. This requires either the reduction of 
regulatory risk, or the use of long-term contracts. In either case the missing money must 
be replaced. In some venues a short-term capacity market that is broadly accepted might 
reduce regulatory risk sufficiently. But given the present regulatory climate it may be best 
to implement a long-term capacity market which both reduces regulatory risk and 
provides investors with moderately long contracts. 
                                                 
26 Long-term contracts curb market power because raising the spot price is not profitable for a supplier who 
has already sold its power in the forward market. 
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The option portfolio approach 
An option portfolio approach has been proposed as a method for a utility’s risk 
management in wholesale markets. This approach utilizes an annual auction of a 
specified quantity of multi-year option contracts on physical capacity with a specified 
range of strike prices. Note that the specification of physical capacity contracts is a major 
step towards convergence with the ICAP approach. This approach has been shown by 
Chao and Wilson (2004) to have beneficial effects on risk management and to transfer 
market power to the forward option market. 
The fundamental deficiency of monthly ICAP and ACAP markets is that 
they do not transfer negotiations to forward markets for long-term 
contracts where the effects on resource adequacy are greater because of 
the greater elasticity of supply from capacity expansion and new entry. 
(Chao and Wilson, 2004) 
This insight into the role of long-term contracts supports the need for convergence and 
the inclusion of options, or equivalently the subtraction of SRShare, in the recent New-
England designs. 
 
As with other approaches, it is necessary to impose an obligation on load to purchase 
some type of contract in order to achieve resource adequacy. In the option portfolio 
approach, the aggregate demand for options is determined by the “obligations of the 
LSEs to satisfy their resource-adequacy obligations specified by the PUC” (Chao and 
Wilson 2004). As with other energy-only approaches there has as yet been no 
specification of the form or magnitude of this obligation, something that is left to the 
PUC. 
 
The option portfolio approach can assure resource adequacy if the load obligation is 
as forceful as the obligation in a forward capacity market design. It must target an 
adequacy level compatible with reliability standards, and it must enforce this with some 
penalty roughly equivalent to an ICAP or FCM demand curve. If this is done in present 
markets, the missing money would be replaced by load paying more than the actuarial 
value of the options obtained. Option prices would be largely determined by the value of 
avoiding administrative penalties. However this mechanism has not yet been brought 
within the purview of the option-portfolio approach.  
The call-option obligation approach 
The call-option obligation approach, like the option-portfolio approach, suggests that load 
be obligated to purchase options with various strike prices. As its name suggests, it puts 
more emphasis on the load obligation. But also like the option-portfolio approach, it does 
not specify how the quantity obligated or the strength of the obligation should be 
determined. In fact it is noted that “the options will be ‘out of the money’ most of the 
time and hence their cost will be relatively low.” (Oren 2005) This appears to suggest that 
the options are not made expensive by high penalties backing obligations that force load 
to pay more than the option’s value. 
 
This approach to assuring generation adequacy is instead based on the concepts of risk 
management and risk sharing arrangements “when needed hedging practices are falling 
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short due to market imperfections and the regulatory interventions.” (Oren 2005) These 
concepts of risk management have been discussed in the California context which has a 
relatively low price cap of only $250. Although a low cap is a classic source of missing 
money, that is not the source of the problem pointed to by risk-management approaches.  
When electricity prices are artificially suppressed by a low cap as in 
California (currently $250/MWh) the call option value is also depressed 
due to limited price volatility. Hence selling call options may not generate 
sufficient income to support investment in generation capacity. It would 
make sense in such an environment to set the strike price to the level of 
the current cap and raise the offer cap on generators that do not sell call 
options. (Oren 2005) 
This explanation begins with limited price volatility caused by the cap. Volatility is the 
source of risk and consequently volatility makes risk management, and hence options, 
valuable. The more risk, the more valuable the option. A low price cap takes away option 
value by taking away risk. Hence selling call options generates less income in the less 
risky, low-cap environment. This explains why the options are often interpreted as 
insurance for load against price volatility. “The call option acts as price insurance.” (Oren 
2005) 
 
However there is a problem with the final step in the explanation. While raising the 
cap would increase risk to consumers and thereby induce them to spend more money on 
insurance (options), this will not translate into more profit for the insurers (generators) if 
the insurance industry is competitive. In a competitive industry, the cost of insurance is 
held down to the cost of providing the insurance (plus a normal rate of return) which will 
be greater in a riskier environment. Hence, if the generators are competitive providers of 
insurance to load, increasing the risk to load will increase the cost of insurance and the 
income of generators, but it will not increase their profits. Instead, their increased 
revenues will simply cover their increased costs. Increased income that simply covers 
increased costs, without increasing profits, will not support or induce any additional 
investment in new capacity. Only if suppliers have monopoly power in the price-spike 
insurance market will imposing higher, riskier prices on load result in increased profits 
and increased investment. 
 
This should not be taken as a criticism of a call option obligation. In fact that is 
central to the convergent design advocated here. The conclusion should be that more 
attention needs to be given to the obligation aspect of option obligations. In a market with 
spot prices that are too low to induce adequate investment, a strong and well targeted 
obligation is required. It must target an adequate level of installed capacity and be backed 
by a penalty sufficient to induce load to pay enough extra for the options to replace the 
money that is missing due to low spot prices. 
The Reliability-Option Approach 
The reliability option approach (Bidwell 2005; Bidwell and Henney 2004) is an option-
based ICAP approach and illustrates how close the ICAP and energy-only approaches are 
once options are added to the ICAP approach along with strongly enforced obligations. 
Like the other two call-option approaches, this one uses options that are both financial 
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and physical. Because it uses a capacity target and buys physically based options up to 
that target level, the price of these options will be driven up to the point where adequate 
new entry occurs. This will force the cost of options to levels well above their option 
value and thereby restore the missing money. 
 
In summary, ICAP approaches replace the missing money and restore adequacy as 
does Hogan’s energy-only approach. All previous energy-only approaches ignore the 
missing money and focus on risk management or market power reduction. However, if 
they expand their obligation components to become the driving force behind option 
prices they can transfer the appropriate level of missing money. Once this is done, and 
the obligation is targeted at the reliable level of installed capacity, the energy-only 
approaches will be nearly equivalent to the ICAP approaches that include options. 
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9. Controlling Reliability: Spot Prices or Capacity Targets?  
Which is the better approach to controlling the level of installed capacity and hence 
reliability, the spot-price approach, or the required-capacity approach? In one case the 
market administrator must design an energy demand curve, and in the other case a 
capacity demand curve. As has been demonstrated, determining the energy demand curve 
is more difficult. But what if the administrator could impose either the perfect energy 
demand curve or the perfect capacity requirement, which would work better? 
Stable Control of Capacity Using Capacity Targets 
There are many ICAP market designs, but the main points concerning capacity 
requirements (targeting) can be understood with the simplest design. Consider an ICAP 
market with a target capacity level of C*, and peakers with fixed costs of $80,000/MW-
year as in the Standard Example described above. To induce new entry, the ICAP market 
must pay enough to bring scarcity revenues (earned by peakers when the spot price 
exceeds $100) up to $80,000. Since scarcity revenues are $20,000/MW-year, the ICAP 
market needs to pay $60,000/MWh at C*, or at least pay that much on average when 
capacity, C, is near C*. 
 
This is all that is needed to determine a reasonable ICAP demand curve, such as the 
one shown in Figure 4. Demand for installed capacity is generated by the threat of a 
penalty. With this curve, any LSE that does not procure its share of C* is penalized twice 
the amount of the missing money or $120,000/MW-year for un-procured capacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If installed capacity, C, is below C*, suppliers will receive an extra $120,000/MW-
year of fixed-cost recovery, and when C > C*, they will earn nothing in the capacity 
market. If C averages C* and is symmetrically distributed, then ICAP payments will 
average $60,000 which is exactly the amount required. Hence the market equilibrium and 
ICAP Demand Curve 
$120,000/
MW-year 
C* 
$60,000/
MW-year 
FCP 
Probability 
distribution of 
installed 
capacity 
Figure 4.  An ICAP Markets Use Capacity Targets 
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average capacity level will be C*. If scarcity revenue has been misestimated, the 
equilibrium will be off by a little. For example if scarcity revenues are actually $40,000 
instead of $20,000/MW-year, investors will build capacity to the point where the ICAP 
payments average only $40,000/MW-year. This means they will be $120,000 one-thirds 
of the time and $0 two-thirds of the time. If the capacity distribution is normal, that 
means equilibrium C will be above the target by 0.43 standard deviations. Typical 
distributions of capacity have been found to have standard deviations near 5% of target 
capacity, so if scarcity revenues are mistakenly under-estimated by $20,000/MWh, half 
of their actual value, installed capacity will miss its target value by about 2%. 
Erratic Control with Spot Energy Prices 
Three problems must be overcome for the price-based control of installed capacity to 
function accurately. (1) VOLL must be estimated. (2) The energy demand curve must be 
administratively set based on VOLL and observable system characteristics. (3) The 
market must forecast profitability accurately from historical prices. The first two 
problems are the administrator’s and were discussed previously; the third is the market’s 
problem and will be addressed here. 
 
Once Hogan’s energy+reserve demand curve has been administratively set, how will 
investors respond? They will understand that when the capacity level is low the market 
will cover more of their fixed costs, and when there is excess capacity it will cover less, 
just as with the ICAP demand curve. This relationship may be called the energy-only 
capacity demand curve since it relates scarcity revenue to capacity level just as the ICAP 
demand curve relates ICAP payments to capacity level. This curve is never calculated by 
proponents of an energy-only market, but it is the curve that matters to investors. It tells 
them how profitable they will find the market at various capacity levels. Their estimate of 
this curve will determine when they invest. They will not invest when the market appears 
to be heading into the low region of the energy-only capacity demand curve. However, if 
the energy-only capacity demand curve indicates the expected capacity level will provide 
generous scarcity revenues, they will invest. 
 
Energy-only market designs do not include the energy-only capacity demand curve 
for two reasons. The practical reason is that it is very difficult to calculate. The 
theoretical reasons is that, if VOLL has been estimated correctly and the energy+reserve 
demand curve designed correctly, economic theory assures the administrator that the 
market should build the right amount of capacity. But, the investor does not care about 
this assurance and is simply concerned with what investment levels are profitable. 
Because a theoretical calculation of the energy-only capacity demand curve is nearly 
impossible, the investor will want to observe actual market prices and use them to 
estimate this curve. What should they expect to see in the market? 
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When capacity is short, they will typically see high scarcity revenues and when there 
is excess capacity, they will typically see low revenues. But weather fluctuations (in both 
temperature and rainfall), nuclear outages, and transmission outages, can all cause 
distortions in this theoretical relationship. Assume that 95% of random variations in 
scarcity revenues stayed within a range from half to twice the expected scarcity value, 
and suppose that scarcity revenues declined by half with each 5% increase in capacity. 
 
Figure 5 above shows the result of a typical simulation run over 18 years according 
to these specifications. With this much data an investor could estimate the shortage hour 
function (which is the basis of the energy-only capacity demand curve) quite accurately. 
Scarcity revenues will be nearly proportional to shortage hours. But the deterministic 
relationship between capacity and shortage hours specified above as well as the amount 
of randomness in the simulation were invented simply to represent the way economists 
think about this equilibrium process. These assumptions have no basis in reality, although 
they are not too implausible. Unfortunately the data on shortage hours from New England 
does not present such a consistent pattern. Figure 6 below shows a reproduction of an 
exhibit filed, with FERC in the ISO-NE’s LICAP case, by investors. 
Figure 5. Simulated “Energy-Only Capacity Demand Curve” 
Shortage Hours [scarcity revenue] vs. Installed Capacity
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This exhibit was filed by the capacity suppliers in support of their view that 
operating-reserve shortage hours do not correlate with capacity levels. Obviously, over a 
long-enough period of time this contention must be wrong. It cannot be the case that a 
power grid is just as reliable with 20% less than normal capacity. But their exhibit 
strongly supports the view that the relationship between profits (which are almost 
proportional to shortage hours) and the capacity level, is very difficult for investors to 
determine by observing market data. Over an 18 year period there is barely any indication 
that the Energy-Only Capacity Demand Curve slopes down. 
 
Moreover, all that can be said about the level of shortage hours at the target level of 
capacity is that it will average 17 hours per year plus or minus 5.2. Since revenues are 
proportional to shortage hours, if a peaker needs 17 peak hours per year to recover its 
fixed costs, it will estimate, after collecting data for 18 years, that it has a 50/50 chance of 
covering fixed costs in this market and a 16% chance of covering less than 70% of its 
fixed costs. Because systems change over time, investors would probably have little faith 
in even this crude estimate. Investors are telling us with this filing that they find it very 
difficult to decode the investment signals sent by a present-day energy-only market. 
 
This is not surprising. Economics makes no guarantees about the time period 
required to estimate a spot price signal to any given degree of accuracy. Economic theory 
only tells us that the signal will be right in the long run, but not how long a run is needed 
Shortage Hours Do Not Correlate with Capacity Surplus Levels
( Exhibit CS-92, of Capacity Suppliers, New England LICAP Case )
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to read the signal accurately. There are several reasons the ISO-NE data may be more 
realistic than the hypothetical data of Figure 5. First, engineering estimates of the 
steepness of a blackout-hours curve shows that these fall by half for each 2.2% increase 
in capacity, but shortage hours, which are at least 50 times more prevalent, fall off much 
more gradually. So the shortage-hour curve is probably much flatter than assumed in 
Figure 5. Second, many shortage hours are caused by security problems and these are 
even less related to installed capacity. This again tends to flatten the energy-only capacity 
demand curve. Furthermore, the ISO-NE data indicates that year-to-year variability in 
shortage hours is greater than assumed. Taken together, even these few considerations 
suggest that the ISO-NE data paints a more realistic picture.  
 
Some will argue that long-term contracts will solve this problem. But the signers of 
long-term contracts can read the spot price average no better than anyone else. Plants will 
sometimes be built, but there is little hope of a tight distribution of the installed capacity 
level around the true equilibrium value. That would require investors to learn things from 
the market in a few years that a statistician cannot deduce after decades. 
 
In summary, installed capacity and hence reliability can be controlled by (1) using a 
capacity (quantity) target or (2) by administratively controlling the spot-price level. The 
capacity target approach is simple and reliable. The spot-price-control approach is 
complex and provides erratic control. 
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10. Spot Energy Prices Make the Best Performance Incentives 
Spot prices are far better than standard capacity payments when it comes to sending 
performance signals. In fact, the original ICAP payments based on nameplate capacity 
sent no performance signals at all. This led to basing payments on “unforced” capacity, 
which is capacity de-rated by its “EFORd” score. This score takes account of forced 
outages for which there is no excuse, but the list of excuses, like the EFORd formula 
itself, is arcane. During a recent cold snap in New England that saw 10,000 MW (out of 
30,000) forced out of service, the average EFORd rating in New England declined by 
only 0.2%. That would result in a 0.2% loss of the annual ICAP payment. Because this 
formula is arcane and the data used in its evaluation is self reported, EFORd is widely 
gamed. Recently NYISO reduced its total unforced capacity by 700 MW to correct for 
gamed EFORd values. 
 
Unlike the administrative and gamable EFORd formula, spot energy prices send 
strong performance signals with no loopholes. If a supplier misses three of a year’s thirty 
shortage hours, it misses nearly 10% of the year’s scarcity revenue. But one need not 
examine the details of spot price incentives to understand why they are the right solution 
to the performance problem. Economic theory recommends competitive prices exactly 
because they send all the right signals, the right signals to consumers, the right signals to 
existing capacity for performance, and the right signals to investors to build the right type 
and quality of capacity. In fact, if there is one central point of economic theory, it is that 
competitive prices provide the best performance incentives, and schemes that do not 
closely mimic them, generally provide poor incentives. This is the main reason 
economics recommends using a market approach. 
 
Since the source of the missing money problem is price suppression (of various 
types), we know that performance/quality signals have been suppressed. The obvious 
remedy is to restore the suppressed prices. The only drawback is the concomitant 
restoration of market power and increased risk, but these can be controlled by hedging 
load, as will be discussed shortly. 
Why Value-Reflective Prices are Irreplaceable 
There is a strong tendency in ICAP markets to develop administrative performance 
incentives to replace the market-price incentives now missing. This can be seen in 
EFORd, the new PJM design, and the performance incentive negotiations in ISO-NE. 
These incentive schemes substitute the cleverness of self-interested committees for the 
cleverness of entrepreneurs motivated by value-reflective prices. For example, price 
signals pay only those who deliver their service when needed. Suppliers inevitably 
believe, or at least claim, that they should not lose any revenue if their failure to deliver 
was “not their fault,” or “mostly not their fault.”27 Price signals never ask whose fault it 
was; ISO’s do not pay those who do not provide power. This is how competitive markets 
                                                 
27 Why is the strictness of prices efficient? First, avoiding the question of fault, avoids a great deal of waste 
even among honest parties. Also many mistakes will be made. More importantly basing payment on fault, 
or lack thereof, induces endless games and weakens many good incentives. If “fault” is to be substituted for 
performance, it would be better to give up on markets. 
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work, and assessing fault and blame is what should be left behind in the old world of 
regulated prices. 
 
High Spot Prices, high enough to induce adequate investment, are not designed to 
send a vast array of accurately targeted performance signals—but they do. They do 
because they reflect, with reasonable accuracy, the actual value of electric power at 
different times. When the system becomes short of operating reserves, a little more power 
is worth a lot, and the price reflects that value. When that value signal goes out to all the 
suppliers, it turns into a signal for every kind of behavior that helps bring more power to 
the system. These signals extend far beyond actions that can be taken immediately. 
Because high prices occur predictably, every time the system is short, and because it will 
be short again in the future, price spikes send signals to prepare for future actions as well 
as to take immediate actions. Suppliers complain that the exact hour of shortage is not 
predictable, so missing it is not their fault. But shortages are inherently unpredictable and 
rewarding those who overcome that unpredictability is one of the benefits of using price 
as the incentive. 
 
ISO’s tend to have a different excuse for avoiding price signals. They would like to 
invent and send their own signals. They see a problem, say not enough dual-fuel 
capability, and they know the solution. Make a penalty for those without dual fuel. While 
this is obviously a throwback to regulation, two points deserve reiteration. First, they 
never think of this penalty until after there has been a severe problem. Prices motivate 
hundreds of engineers and managers to think ahead, so when the next new problem 
occurs, they can profit from it or avoid a penalty. Prices induce anticipation of problems 
by many specialists. Regulatory penalties are set by a few as a reaction to past problems. 
Second, penalties are calibrated poorly and are not self-adjusting. If more dual-fuel 
capability is needed, who should install it? That depends on costs which vary from plant 
to plant. A price incentive will induce those who can act most cheaply to take action. 
That will reduce the need, and the price signal will automatically weaken. This continues 
until just enough, and just the right selection of, plants have taken action. 
Hedging Price Spikes 
Price spikes are needed for performance incentives but we need to avoid the risks and 
market power that come with high prices. Options, long-term energy contracts, and other 
forms of hedging can all do the job. Here is a simple example that illustrates the principle 
behind all such mechanisms. 
 
Suppose we would like the market to pay a $5,000/MWh scarcity price for 10 
shortage hours that occurs on an unpredictable day each August. Under such scarcity 
pricing, a megawatt that produces power in all 10 hot hours is paid $50,000, and one that 
produces for only 2 hours is paid $10,000. 
 
How a Call Option Works. The point of using a call option is to allow higher 
prices to send stronger performance signals without increasing market power or risk. 
First, how does it work? In the current example, load purchases a call option with a strike 
price of $1000 (the initial offer cap) from a supplier for a price of $40,000/MW. The call 
option gives load the right to buy power from the supplier at a price of $1000/MWh at 
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any time. Load exercises the option exactly when the market price is greater than $1000, 
and in this example, that is during shortage hours when the spot price goes to $5,000. 
Because this is a financial arrangement, the load will purchase its power from the ISO for 
$5,000 and the supplier will sell its power to the ISO for $5,000, but then the supplier 
must pay the load $4,000 under the call option, so that, in effect load has bought power 
from the supplier at a net cost of $1000. This means that if the generator does supply 
energy in the shortage hour it earns net revenue of $1,000, which is just the same as 
under the initial offer cap. But if the supplier fails to perform during a shortage hour, it 
makes nothing and loses $4,000/MWh paid to load to cover the high price. 
 
Considering the hedge price minus the cost of calls during shortage hours ($4,000), 
the generator that produces in all 10 hours keeps the full $40,000 and has another 
$10,000 of revenue from prices at the $1000 cap. That is a total of $50,000, exactly the 
same as it would make, with no call option, from the 10 shortage hours with $5,000 
scarcity prices. Other performance levels are also paid identically as shown in the table 
below.  
 
Table 3.  Performance Incentives  in a High-Spot-Price* Market with a Hedge 
Performance 
Payment with  
un-hedged high prices 
Payment  with high prices and a hedge contract 
(purchased for $40,000) 
10 hours $50,000  $40,000 – $0 + $10,000   =   $50,000  
2 hours $10,000 $40,000 – $32,000 + $2,000 = $10,000 
0 hours $0  $40,000 – 10 x $4,000 + $0 =  $0 
* The spot price cap is $5000, but the highest price paid under the hedge is $1000. 
 
Table 3 shows that with the call option in place, suppliers receive the same payment, at 
every level of performance, as without the call option. The performance incentive with a 
call option is identical to the performance incentive without a call option. For every 
MWh of performance, the supplier is still better off by $50,000 during shortage hours. 
Also, the missing money restored by raising the price cap is not affected by imposing the 
call option, provided the right price is paid for the option. 
 
Risk. Does hedging control the risk and market power associated with high price 
spikes? First consider risk. Suppose the market has one hot day (10 hot hours) in half the 
years and two hot days in the other years. Now the market is risky because scarcity 
revenues are only half as much in cool years as in hot years. Under the $5000 cap, as 
compared with the $1000 cap, Good (full performance) suppliers would make an extra 
$40,000 in half the years and an extra $80,000 in the other years, $60,000/year on 
average. If they build their plant and immediately face three cool summers, they will fall 
3×$20,000/MW short of the average, earning $40,000 instead of the average $60,000. 
This is market risk. But, if they sell a call option for $60,000/MW-year, they will 
eliminate their risk, as will load. More precisely, they will eliminate their market risk. 
Poor performers will still suffer from performance risk, just as they should, but Good 
performers will be guaranteed $60,000/MW-year in cool and hot years alike. Similarly 
load will pay only $60,000/MWh in cool and hot years alike. 
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Market Power. What if a supplier withholds and creates an artificial shortage day 
during a cool summer?  Without the call option, every MW that the supplier still has in 
the market will be paid an extra $4,000/MWh for 10 hours. That could be very profitable. 
With a call option, it will make nothing extra from prices above $1000 because the hedge 
does not allow it. In either case the supplier will lose $4,000 per MWh on every MWh it 
withholds when exercising market power. Because of this, with the call option, it will 
actually lose money any time it tries to exercise market power. The call option 
completely eliminates the increase in market power that would normally be caused by 
raising the price cap from $1000 to $5000. 
 
Following the Load.  While advocates of options and forward-energy contracts 
generally recognize that these should follow the load, the specific contracts they 
recommend hedge a pre-specified number of MW. If load collectively owns 50 GW of 
options with strike prices of $500 or less and the real-time price goes to $1000 when load 
is only 30 GW, load will be fully covered for the 30 GW, but will earn a windfall profit 
of $500/MWh on the remaining 20 GW of call options that it has purchased but which are 
not required to cover load ($10 million per hour). But such windfall profits are not free. 
They will be paid for in advance in the cost of the options, and this cost will include a 
risk premium for the risk imposed on suppliers, who experience windfall losses whenever 
load experiences windfall profits. 
 
The best options will hedge load exactly. This is easily accomplished when the ISO 
purchases the options from capacity, and all capacity is responsible for its share of actual 
load, as is the case with the proposed FCM. If a supplier sells 5 GW of capacity with 
options, and the ISO buys 50 GW of capacity total, then the supplier is obligated to hedge 
10% of actual load at all times. When load is 30 GW, the supplier will be hedging only 3 
GW and there will be no windfall profits or losses. This will minimize risk and the cost of 
risk premiums to load. 
 
Conclusion. The call option perfectly preserves the performance incentives of 
higher spot prices, while completely eliminating (in fact reversing) their inducement to 
exercise market power and eliminating all of the market risk imposed by higher spot 
prices. The performance risk is fully retained, which is not a benefit, but is necessary for 
the retention of performance incentives. 
 
In summary, spot prices send far more diverse and accurate signals than 
administrative penalties. Completely hedging price spikes passes through 100% of their 
performance incentive while eliminating their market power and risk problems. Call 
options do not themselves return any of the missing money nor provide any of the 
performance incentive. Those tasks are both accomplished by the higher spot prices and 
are unaffected by the option. Without call options, or some similar hedge, the missing 
money could still be replaced safely with ICAP payments, but the call option allows the 
use of high prices which solve the performance and investment-quality problems caused 
by the same price suppressions that caused the RA problem. Hedging allows an efficient, 
market-based (High-Spot-Price) solution to the RA problem, in place of the blunt 
regulatory ICAP solution of monthly welfare checks for suppliers. 
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11. Assembling a Basic Design 
Conceptually, the basic market design is two thirds complete. All that remains is to add 
the inducement to invest, which should be guided by an installed-capacity target. But 
before describing that, it is useful to consolidate progress made to this point. These are 
the three steps to the Basic Design: 
 
1) Re-implement full-strength spot pricing. 
2) Hedge all load against these High Spot Prices. 
3) Link hedge payments to the installed capacity target. 
 
The first step solves the adequacy problem and restores performance incentives. The 
second step protects consumers from market power and suppliers from risk, but leaves 
the price of the hedge ambiguous, which re-opens the adequacy problem. The third step 
solves the adequacy problem again. 
 
Why does it make sense to solve the adequacy problem in step 1, re-open it in step 2 
and re-solve it in step 3? First, it is simply necessary. Sufficiently-high prices are needed 
for performance incentives, but must be hedged away to prevent market power. The 
second reason is that, when the adequacy problem is re-solved in step 3, the solution is an 
improvement over the solution in step 1, because a capacity target implemented with a 
forward market is a better solution than a pure price-spike solution. 
 
Solving the adequacy problem with High Spot Prices requires price-cap calculations 
that are problematic (VOLL calculations are often recommended) and erratic energy 
prices that investors find hard to interpret (see Section 9). Fortunately, High Spot Prices 
used for performance signals can greatly improve performance signals even if they are 
not terribly accurate with respect to their height. Their efficacy depends more on their 
timing. Spot prices are high exactly when operating-reserves are in short supply. As an 
hourly signal they are clear; as a twenty-year investment signal, they are not. When used 
as performance signals they can be based on C* and simple statistics (instead of VOLL). 
 
Finally, by using a capacity auction, investors can be sent accurate price and quantity 
signals every year. The auction will buy almost exactly the amount needed at a price that 
is determined by a competitive market. The investment incentive will be provided by a 
three-to-five year contract followed by stable annual ICAP prices set by future auctions. 
The capacity auction dramatically reduces investor risk relative to an energy-only market. 
Because the law of one price dictates that all existing generation will partake of the 
investor’s risk premium, this risk reduction provides a major savings to load. 
 
The following Basic FCM Design is only intended to illustrate basic principles. It 
should not be assumed for example, that in a functioning design the option strike price 
will equal the marginal cost of a new peaker, or that the auction rules will be simple as in 
the Basic Design. The Basic Design shows how to implement appropriately the crucial 
RA program characteristics listed in comparison Table 1 of Section 4. 
Step 1: Design Full-Strength Spot Prices 
The first task when implementing higher spot prices is to asses how low the current ones 
are. This requires data and a statistical analysis similar to that shown in Figure 6. The 
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question to be answered is, how much scarcity revenue, SR, (fixed-cost recovery) would 
be earned by a new peaker if the system’s capacity level were adequate? Suppose that 
turned out to be $20,000/MW, as in this paper’s Standard Example (p. 15). 
 
The second task is to estimate the annualized fixed cost of the Benchmark peaker. 
Suppose that is FCP = $80,000/MW. This indicates prices need to be roughly four times 
higher to induce investment up to the level of adequate capacity. 
 
To cover FCP, scarcity revenues need to be multiplied by M = FCP / SR = 4. To 
accomplish this, every point on the energy-demand curve, above the variable cost of a 
peaker, VCP, which is also the call-option’s strike price, PS, should be scaled up by M. 
Hence, prices will be transformed as follows:  
 Higher prices:  P   Î   PS  + M × ( P – Ps )  
 Higher price cap = PS + M × ( PCap – PS ) = e.g. $3700 
In the Standard Example, the new higher price cap would be $(100 + 4 × (1000-100)), or 
$3,700. Note that the cap is not determined by VOLL, so that contentious value need not 
be estimated. The higher demand curve will provide the performance incentives, but as 
will be discussed shortly, load will be protected from these high prices by a complete 
hedge. 
 
Suppliers are paid their normal revenues below the strike price (PS = $100) plus M 
times their normal scarcity revenues.  
 Supplier Revenue =  NR   +   M × SR, 
where NR is revenue from below the PS. But, the current market already pays SR, and 
there is no reason to disrupt these payments. To make this clear, the revenue formula is 
best re-written as: 
 Supplier Revenue =  NR   +   SR   +   (M – 1) SR 
Only (M – 1) SR is paid by FCM. This requires no change to the market except for 
accounting. The first step can then be summarized as having the engineers estimate the 
level of SR that occurs with adequate generation, obtaining an estimate of FCP, 
computing M = FCP / SR, and using this to increase scarcity payments to suppliers. 
Step 2: Hedge All Load with Call Options 
The second step is to hedge the high prices completely in order to eliminate their 
damaging side effects without eliminating their performance incentives. The hedge will 
be a call option with strike price, PS, which in the Basic Design equals VCP, so the call 
option exactly covers the scarcity revenues. The call option is paid for with the ICAP 
payment, PIC. Because the call option covers the scarcity revenues exactly, suppliers must 
pay load all scarcity revenues they earn from capacity covered by the call option. 
 
That raises the question of how much capacity is covered. As noted by Oren (2005), 
it is only necessary, and is in fact best, to cover all energy and reserves purchased by 
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load, but no more.28 Load is completely hedged in real time, so the quantity of the hedge 
varies continuously. With this specification, all scarcity revenues paid by load are 
returned. As will be seen shortly, this leaves performance incentives intact while 
minimizing risk to both load and suppliers. Each supplier is responsible for its 
proportionate share of the hedge. Hence if 50 GW of supply is purchased in the FCM, 
and one supplier sells 5 GW, it is responsible for a call option on 10% of total energy and 
reserves delivered at every point in time. The following payment formula implements this 
call option. 
 Supplier Revenue =  NR   +   PIC   +   M × ( SR – SRShare ). 
PIC is the price of installed capacity, which carries with it a call option (hedge).29 A Good 
supplier will supply its share of energy plus reserves and will earn scarcity revenues of 
SRShare, and so its revenue will be unaffected by the performance incentive provided by 
FCM, regardless of any possible price fluctuations.  
 
If the supplier provides less than its share when the price is above PS (e.g. above 
$100), its scarcity revenue, SR, will fall below SRShare, and it will be subject to a 
deduction from PIC equal to M times its shortfall in scarcity revenues. Because actual 
load equals actual supply at all times, the sum of all SRShare values equals the sum of all 
SR values. Since load must pay the sum of SR but receives as hedge payments the sum of 
SRShare, the net revenue to load from scarcity rents minus hedge payments is zero, and 
load is completely unaffected by performance payments and feels absolutely no effect 
from the high prices. 
 
All suppliers, however, are affected by these payments. Even the Good suppliers 
who always provide their Share and receive neither extra payments nor deductions are 
affected. They know that if they were to provide one MWh less during a shortage hour, 
they would lose $3700/MWh. This is why they are Good performers. Without this 
incentive, they would slack off from time to time. All generation is subject to exactly this 
same incentive, whether it underperforms or over achieves. Each one knows it will earn 
an extra $3700 for each additional MWh supplied and lose that same amount for any 
MWh of reduced output, whenever the price is at the offer cap. This is not some made-up 
incentive scheme like EFORd, these performance incentives are simply the result of 
normal market prices that have not been suppressed and replaced with regulated 
subsidies.  
 
Again this formula can be re-written to reflect the scarcity revenues that are actually 
paid in the spot market under the existing offer cap. 
 
Supplier revenue  
=    [NR  +  SR]  + [PIC   –   SRShare  +   (M – 1) ( SR – SRShare ) ] 
= (Energy Market)   + (          Capacity Market           ) 
 
                                                 
28 A tiny change in this definition will considerably improve incentives for large suppliers, and that is 
recommended, but not described here. 
29 From this point on it is best to think of revenues, such as NR and SR as revenues per MW-year of 
capacity for some particular unit.   PIC is the price of installed capacity in $/MW-year. 
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The first term, in square brackets, represents existing market payments, while the other 
payments are from the FCM. This is the complete description of market payments. It 
should be noted that the FCM payment hedges the previously existing scarcity revenues 
as well as the additional revenues from high prices. As a consequence, FCM actually 
reduces the market power and risk currently present in the spot energy market. 
 
In summary, from load’s point of view, the high prices are only conceptual because 
they never experience them, but a generator that misses an hour of production when this 
“conceptual” price is $3700 will, in fact, lose $3700 per MW of idle capacity, and be 
rewarded $3700 per MW of any additional output. These prices shift revenue from poor 
performers to good performers, but not to or from load. 
Step 3: Purchase an Adequate Level of Hedged Capacity 
Without the ICAP payment (PIC) a Good generator would earn only NR, which is to say 
just “normal” spot market revenues below the strike price, PS. (This is because the FCM 
hedge would cancel SR.) This means the Benchmark peaker would recover no fixed 
costs, and other types of generation would earn too little. Without PIC there would be 
even less incentive to invest than before the FCM. The Benchmark peaker recovers all of 
its fixed costs from PIC. Since the equilibrium investment level will be right if 
Benchmark units have proper incentives, PIC tells the complete investment story with 
regard to investment level. It needs to be above FCP when investment is needed and 
below FCP when there is excess capacity.30 
 
There are two ways to set PIC, with a short-term ICAP market, and with a forward 
capacity market, FCM. A forward market has two principal advantages; it stabilizes 
installed capacity better, and if designed well, stabilizes PIC better.31 Stabilizing capacity 
might result in needing 2% less capacity to attain the same level of reliability. Since 
peaker fixed costs applied to all capacity are under 20% of retail costs, this will save only 
about 0.4% of retail. Stabilizing PIC (and paying a constant PIC for four years to new 
capacity) is more difficult to evaluate, but holds greater potential for savings. If it reduces 
the risk premium by 2%, which seems plausible, that would reduce FCP by about 10%, 
and retail costs by about 2%. 
 
Although FCM appears to be a superior approach, there may be institutional barriers 
to its implementation in California and elsewhere. For this reason, both approaches will 
be described here. They are essentially interchangeable. Both require the administrator to 
select a C*, which will provide the desired level of reliability, and both determine PIC. 
                                                 
30 In disequilibrium this is not the case. For example, in ISO-NE, where base-load plants are reaping 
windfall profits from high gas prices, new baseload units should want to enter the market and be willing to 
under-bid peakers to do so. In this case FCM will adjust the price automatically year by year, while a short-
term ICAP market with a sloping demand curve will set the price correctly but may take more than one 
year to do so and will overbuild capacity by a few percent. 
31 It is often said that a forward market reduces market power in the capacity market by making the market 
contestable by new entrants. Unfortunately, with only 2-3% new entrants every year, this effect is 
insufficient to make up for the problems of controlling market power exercised by existing generation, 
which can employ new strategies in the more complex setting of a sequence of auctions with active 
bidding. 
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Short-term ICAP markets 
A contemporary ICAP market uses a sloped demand curve that changes PIC gradually as 
installed capacity, C, changes. The demand curve raises PIC when C falls below C*, and 
lowers PIC when C rises above C*. The result is that installed capacity will be kept in the 
vicinity of C*. This is a simple and effective mechanism. 
 
Such markets are often criticized for being monthly, with the comment “that is far 
too short a time period to induce a thirty-year investment.” This misses the point. The 
investment signal is the expectation of future payments, not the present month’s payment. 
In fact airplanes are thirty year investments driven entirely by purchases made only about 
a month in advance. Hotels, auto factories, chip factories, etc. provide a myriad of other 
examples. Short-term capacity markets could pay hourly and would work fine, provided 
investors believe the payments will continue. In that respect long-term markets have little 
advantage. They too can be undone by regulators or courts. As long as their payments are 
sure to continue at the necessary average rate, investors will invest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another criticism of these markets is that the regulator sets the price—not the 
market. But this is like your local restaurant. Customers do not bid to set the price of their 
steak dinner. Does this mean it is not a market price? The restaurant sets the price, 
watches supply and demand for a few months, and corrects it if these are not in balance. 
In the long run, the price is set by the competitive market for steak dinners. The same is 
true of the long-run value of PIC in a short-term ICAP market.32  
                                                 
32 When there is one seller faced with many buyers, the seller traditionally sets and adjusts the price to 
market condition. But, if there is one buyer and many sellers, it is more efficient to have the buyer (ISO) set 
and adjust the prices. This also occurs in completely private markets. 
2FCP 
C* 
PIC 
Figure 7.  How an ICAP market implements a capacity target. 
An ICAP Capacity-Demand Curve 
FCP 
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Forward ICAP markets 
A forward ICAP market (FCM), relies on new-entry to set the PIC. Consequently, a 
forward capacity auction typically purchases capacity three years in advance. New 
capacity contracts would typically have a duration of one to five years. Four years is 
suggested. Because load grows, the annual auctions typically buy 1% to 3% new 
capacity. 
 
Theoretically the demand curve for the auction should reflect the marginal value of 
capacity, but a vertical demand curve will suffice for the Basic FCM Design. This 
vertical demand curve is administratively set at C*. When the auction is held, existing 
capacity will typically total less than C*, and since it is cheaper to supply existing 
capacity (usually almost free), new capacity will set the price. 
 
Investors will observe the design of the FCM and see that it will take back the 
average scarcity revenue paid by the energy market, and that if they are Good suppliers—
that provide their share on average during scarcity events—they will earn nothing from 
the performance incentive. Hence a Good Benchmark supplier will simply bid its fixed 
costs, FCP. A better than Good supplier will subtract off its expected performance bonus, 
while a poor supplier will bid above its fixed costs because it will ultimately earn less 
than the clearing price, PIC. A baseload unit will subtract its expected inframarginal rents 
from its fixed-costs when it bids. 
 
It may seem that investors are forced to make complex calculations in order to bid 
correctly, but investors must always make such calculations when deciding to invest. 
They must always predict all of their future sources of income and all of their future 
costs. The FCM simplifies their predictions by making it easier to predict the future 
fluctuations in scarcity revenues. Under FCM these fluctuations will be fully hedged—
they will be zero if their performance is Good. That is an easy prediction. Fixed cost 
recovery will no longer undergo wild swings because the market is short or long on 
capacity (even if it really is), or because the summer is hot or cold, or because a nuclear 
unit has gone out unexpectedly. All of these difficult-to-predict circumstances that now 
have dramatic impacts on profit will no longer matter. That will simplify the decision of 
whether to invest or not, and the decision of how much to bid. It will also reduce investor 
risk and the risk premiums passed on to consumers. 
 
Investors will still need to predict future earning from the FCM, in other words 
future PIC levels. Providing new investors with a relatively long contract will assure 
investors that they will be paid at least their bid price during their first several years of 
operation. (Of course this will be somewhat adjusted by their performance bonus.) 
 
Once a new supplier’s initial contract expires, it will start relying on the annually set 
PIC over which it has essentially no control (just as it has no control over energy prices). 
Because PIC provides a major source of fixed-cost recovery for all suppliers, it should be 
as stable and predictable as possible while still being determined by the market. To this 
end, PIC should be free of market power effects to the extent possible, and should not fall 
to zero if there are a few MW of excess capacity. This is accomplished by setting PIC on 
the basis of new-entry bids alone because it is existing capacity that has the most 
potential for exercising market power. On rare occasions, when no new entry is required 
  54   
and as a consequence, there are too-few new-entry bids to competitively determine a 
price, PIC should be set a little lower than last year’s PIC, perhaps 10% lower. 
 
Basic Design summary: 
1) Estimate FCP and SR for a Benchmark unit and select C*.  Set M = FCP / SR. 
2) Hold an annual auction three years in advance to purchase C* capacity and 
determine the clearing price, PIC. 
3) Pay auction winners, PIC   –   SRShare +   (M – 1) ( SR – SRShare ), 
where SR is a supplier’s actual scarcity revenue, and SRShare is that supplier’s 
Share of capacity sold in the auction times total SR. 
4) New entrants get four-year contracts, existing generators, one-year contracts. 
5) Loads pay monthly FCM cost in proportion to their estimated annual peak load. 
6) Zones are priced according to inter-zonal transmission limits and nodal-pricing 
formulas. 
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12. Additions to the Basic Design 
The Basic short-term ICAP design is relatively complete, but the Basic FCM Design 
described above is intended only to illustrate the central ideas of FCM and is missing 
many important practical features. A number of these are discussed below, but no attempt 
will be made to present a complete working design, which should in any case be tailored 
to the particular market. The features discussed below are (1) market power in the FCM 
auction, (2) the descending clock auction, (3) the call options (4) capacity exports, (5) 
lumpy supply bids, (6) the definition of capacity, and finally (7) implementation. 
1. Market Power in the FCM Auction 
All RA approaches require load to purchase something, mandatory hedges, obligatory 
call options, or in the case of FCM, capacity contracts. This requirement is actually a 
demand for a product imposed on load, and load’s demand simply reflects this regulatory 
obligation. Such obligations are generally quite inelastic. They say “buy this much,” 
rather than, “buy extra if it is cheaper and less if it costs more.” Long-term RA 
approaches have generally specified a vertical, completely inelastic, demand curve, and 
FCM is no exception. Unfortunately, inelastic demand is the classic way to give suppliers 
market power. 
 
A forward auction combats market power by allowing new entry, but since the 
auction only buys 2% new capacity in any given year, one cannot depend on enough bids 
to supply 20% new capacity. No one wants to spend a lot of money planning an 
investment that has only a small chance of being realized. If the supply curve ends at, 
say, 8% new entry, then existing suppliers could withhold 6.1% and drive the clearing 
price to the auction’s starting price. In the ISO-NE design, this would double the clearing 
price received by the 94% of capacity not withheld. If existing capacity is allowed to 
withhold and drive up the price of contracts, all of the long-term approaches are in danger 
from the exercise of market power. 
 
The purpose of FCM is to make sure that the market has enough installed capacity, 
not to induce installed capacity to sell energy. Hence, existing capacity is considered 
installed capacity, whether or not it chooses to bid in the FCM auction. It can only lose 
this status by retiring, exporting, or mothballing. To prevent withholding and market 
power, existing units are counted as supply in the FCM auction unless they request to 
retire, export or mothball. In these cases, certain restrictions, consistent with the nature of 
the request, and inhibiting of market power, can be placed on them. 
2. The descending clock auction 
The auction should use a descending-clock design. This type of auction starts by naming 
a high opening price, 2×FCP, or roughly twice the eventual clearing price, is an 
appropriate choice. At that price, all suppliers must bid in all of their proposed supply. 
They cannot increase quantity as the price descends. At fixed intervals the auctioneer 
lowers the price and suppliers can reduce their quantity bids (they do not bid price). 
When the quantity becomes insufficient to meet the target capacity level, C*, the auction 
stops and the last price at which the target was met is selected as the clearing price, PIC. 
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There are three general techniques for structuring the auction to reduce market 
power. The first is to ignore existing suppliers who wish to withhold but do not wish to 
retire, export or mothball. Their capacity will remain installed capacity and it would be 
foolish to allow them to force load to buy new replacement capacity to replace capacity 
still in the energy market. 
 
The second technique is to purchase only a limited amount of new capacity in the 
main auction and use the first of several reconfiguration auctions to top up new capacity 
as needed for special circumstances.33 The quantity of new capacity purchased in the 
main auction might be the greater of the years load growth and the amount needed to 
reach C* without considering retirements, exports and mothballs.34 This prevents existing 
supply from withholding from the main auction which sets the price of existing supply 
(90%+ of capacity), which greatly reduces its market power. The price of some new 
capacity could still be manipulated in the re-configuration auction, but such 
manipulations increase total installed capacity and reduce future auction prices. 
 
The third technique is simply to require all export bids to be entered before the 
auction. In a descending clock auction, bids are quantities, but when entered before the 
auction, a price and quantity to be withdrawn are stated. The descending clock design 
allows bidders to learn more about the market as the auction proceeds, which results in 
more efficient bids. Such informational effects will not be dramatic, but the descending 
clock mechanism has many advantages and should be selected.  
3. Call Options 
In order to allow all capacity, even old inefficient capacity to have a full physical hedge 
of their call option, it is best to raise the strike price of the call options to roughly three 
times VCP. This will also prevent the real-time market from being too risk-free and 
attracting too much participation relative to the DA market.35 It will also prevent gas 
price fluctuations from pushing VCP above the strike price. A higher strike price will 
require a higher multiplier, M, but no other changes. 
4. Capacity Exports from CAISO 
Because export capabilities from CAISO are so extensive, exports of capacity pose a 
particularly severe threat of market power. Since the seasonal pattern of energy imports 
and exports is quite systematic it may be possible to simply forbid the exporting of 
capacity during certain seasons and thereby achieve sufficient protection from market 
power. 
5. Lumpy Supply Bids 
Supply bids will generally specify quantities that correspond to units or a group of units 
that are cheaper when built as a group. Consequently it will not be possible to buy exactly 
the amount specified by the demand curve. Accepting partial bids would impose 
                                                 
33 It may be possible to, combine the first reconfiguration auction with the main auction. 
34 If load growth is greater than the total required new capacity, only the total should be purchased. 
35 To prevent too much weight from being placed on DA bidding requirements, suppliers should be allowed 
the use of virtual bids. 
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unnecessary risk on new suppliers and does not correspond with reality, so the auction 
will either accept an entire new-capacity bid, or none of it. 
 
Export and import bids will be accepted in part when appropriate. If accepting the 
entire quantity for export would reduce C below C*, then only a fraction of the bid is 
accepted for export, the rest remains with the ISO.  
6. Defining Capacity 
Suppliers bid a quantity of capacity, but they cannot be allowed to determine the capacity 
rating of their own units. Instead, a capacity bid should be either its nameplate value or 
something determined by the ISO’s engineers. The traditional EFORd value would be 
better than nameplate, but on wind units, this can be over 90% for a unit whose average 
performance is 30%. This is mainly a problem if too low a value for M is used, but this 
will likely be the case because it is difficult to estimate M accurately (as it comes from 
the energy-only design track) and suppliers will argue strongly for a low M to favor their 
existing plants. 
 
To understand the problem, consider a half-strength performance incentive (M is half 
what it should be). Suppose the average PIC is $6/kW-month and a non-performing unit 
would lose on average only half of that. A 100 MW wind farm with a 40 MW average 
performance would lose half the difference between 100 and 40, and would be paid 
exactly as a perfectly performing 70 MW wind farm. It would be best if an engineering-
base rating of 40 MW could be given to such a wind farm. Then it would perform on 
average as rated and be paid PIC for 40 MW with no correction due to performance 
incentives. 
 
It would be best to start with an engineering-based estimate of capacity and then 
adjust it each year towards the previous year’s performance. For example, using a 20% 
adjustment rate, if the initial estimate were 40% and the performance was only 30% in 
the first year, then the second years value would be 38%. 
7. Practicality of Implementation 
Centralization vs. bilateral contracting. The FCM is centralized exactly as a nodal energy 
market is centralized. As with a nodal market, centralization does not prevent every 
central-market transaction from being hedged with bilateral contracts. In fact, having a 
central market makes the bilateral markets more efficient and gives small participants the 
option of relying on the central market as a low-cost alternative.  
 
Administrative parameters. Every solution to the RA problem depends on centrally 
set parameters. An FCM sets two key parameters, M, the scarcity revenue multiplier and 
C*, the installed capacity target.36 These determine respectively, the performance 
incentive and the market’s equilibrium level of installed capacity. The multiplier need not 
be accurately determined. Current ICAP markets have a multiplier of one, when it should 
be in the range of 3 to 9 because that is the extent of current energy-price suppression. 
Using an M of 3 when it should be 5 would still be excellent progress. 
 
                                                 
36  An energy-only market sets VOLL, in place of C*, and the energy-demand-curve parameters. 
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Auction complexity. Compared to holding a daily nodal-price auction that produces 
tens of thousands of prices per day, the FCM auction is child’s play. It produces one price 
per year per zone for the main auction and the same for each of perhaps four, much 
smaller, reconfiguration auctions. Preparing bids is the major effort, but the auction 
simplifies life for investors. The auction provides a far better signal of whether the 
project is worth doing than can be attained in a completely decentralized market. If you 
cannot beat your competitors in the auction, you can drop the project before you break 
ground. And if you do win, you get a guarantee of substantial fixed-cost coverage for the 
first four years of operation. Moreover the expected revenue from scarcity revenues is far 
more predictable with than without the FCM because these are hedged. 
 
Load’s role.  Load must pay its share of PIC when the ISO sends it a bill. It is best if 
load’s share can be adjusted monthly, and this will likely result in some complex 
accounting of customers. But this is entirely unnecessary. The LSEs’ monthly load is 
already tracked, and this can be used to accurately predict their peak annual loads. A little 
data and some spreadsheet statistics can do the job. 
 
Monitoring Suppliers.  The primary determinate of suppliers’ payments is simply 
their scarcity revenues in the existing and unaltered spot energy market. This is already 
tracked by the ISO’s accounting department. A more difficult task is estimating a unit’s 
effective capacity. For example, wind turbines typically have an effective capacity, as 
determined by their scarcity revenues, of roughly 30%. But this can be done once at the 
beginning according to the unit’s type and then adjusted annually based on SR / SRShare. 
 
Zonal Parameters.  If a zonal version of FCM is to be used, and this is 
recommended, each zone will need its own C*, and quantification of the transmission 
limits between zones.37 Again, these are values the system already needs to track for 
reliability purposes. The auction will need to determine different prices for each zone. 
The pricing principles are just marginal-cost pricing, the same as used for nodal pricing. 
 
Contrary to the claims of some energy-only advocates, there is no need “to arrange 
for transmission delivery or link the contract to any particular generating facility.” 
Bilateral contracts for ICAP are entirely financial, just like bilateral contracts for energy. 
 
Summary of Implementation.  A central FCM is more complex than a short-term 
ICAP with similarly hedged High-Spot-Prices because of the descending-clock auction 
and the yearly reconfiguration auctions. But by nodal pricing standards, it is simple. An 
FCM is basically like an extremely slow nodal pricing market with very few nodes. 
                                                 
37 The NYISO has defined C* for two zones, NYC and Long Island, and for the entire control area. This is 
logical from a reliability perspective, but requires a slight change in the nodal pricing formulas. It does not 
require a change from marginal-cost pricing, but simply its application with a “nested” approach as NYISO 
has done. N zones will always require N values of C* and will produce up to N distinct prices. 
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13. The Final Step to Convergence 
In October 2000, Harry Singh began his short paper on a call option alternative to ICAP 
with these observations. 
There are at least two distinct approaches for ensuring generation 
adequacy… The first approach … involves setting Installed Capacity 
(ICAP) obligations…. An alternative approach relies primarily on spot 
price signals in the energy market.... A new approach is proposed that 
combines elements of both paradigms and relies on call options for 
energy. (Singh 2000, p. 1) 
Singh’s proposal was five years ahead of his time and received little attention. Although 
his proposal did not address the missing money problem directly it pointed explicitly 
towards a convergent design. Five years later we have a workable new approach that 
combines these two elements. The energy-only and capacity-market tracks of resource 
adequacy design have nearly converged, with only one major discrepancy remaining. 
This convergence includes the following conclusions: 
 
1) The source of the adequacy problem is the suppression of scarcity prices. 
2) This results in missing money and missing performance incentives. 
3) Both should be restored. 
4) Restored high energy prices should be used for performance incentives. 
5) High energy prices should be hedged with call-options. 
 
This is a remarkable convergence, but it still leaves two questions unresolved. Because 
they are linked by design consideration, there is only one remaining fundamental choice. 
 
The choice is between two design combinations: 
 
Design Combination 1: The capacity-target approach. Load is obligated to purchase C* 
of hedged capacity exposed to High Spot Prices. Unpurchased capacity does not 
receive High Spot Prices. 
Design Combination 2: The energy-price-control approach. All capacity receives High 
Spot Prices, and load is obligated to purchase C* of physically-backed hedges. 
 
High Spot Prices are prices that are high enough to induce C* on their own. As can be 
seen, the differences between the two designs are so subtle that they seem almost not to 
matter. However, they do matter, because they change incentives substantially.  
 
Supplier incentives.  Under the capacity-target approach, suppliers who do not sell 
their capacity along with a hedge do not receive high prices and consequently do not have 
their missing money restored. This means they lose, in our Standard Example, 
$60,000/MW-year. Under the energy-price-control approach, suppliers who do not sell a 
physical hedge, still receive High Spot Prices and consequently experience only an 
increase in risk. They have no expected (average) loss of revenue. While risk reduction 
has value, risk premiums are only on the order of 10%, so the motivation of suppliers to 
participate in hedging is roughly ten times greater under the capacity-target approach. 
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Load incentives.  The motivation for load to participate in hedging is also quite 
different under the two designs. Under the capacity-target approach they must purchase 
hedges. Under the energy-price-control approach, load simply faces greater risk from 
higher spot prices if they do not. Since load purchases almost no forward contracts in the 
three to seven year range with a $1000 cap, it is unlikely that they will opt for full 
coverage simply because the cap is raised to $5000. 
 
The sources of the dichotomy.  The capacity-target approach corresponds to ISO-NE’s 
LICAP design and the FCM design presented here. The energy-price-control approach 
corresponds to Hogan’s design in which first prices would be raised for the entire market, 
and second, mandatory hedges would be imposed on load. 
Implications for Investment stability  
To see how the two Design Combinations differ with respect to investment incentives, 
consider a case where the High Spot Prices are actually set twice as high as needed. 
 
Design Combination 1: The performance incentive will double. The investment level will 
be unaffected. 
Design Combination 2: The fixed cost recovery of peakers will double at C*. This will 
push C well past C*. Performance incentives will also double. 
 
On the other hand, if High Spot Prices were set half as high as needed the result would 
not necessarily be symmetrical but opposite. 
 
Design Combination 1: The performance incentive will halve. The investment level will 
be unaffected. 
Design Combination 2: Assuming load’s obligation to purchase C* of hedged capacity is 
backed by sufficient penalties, this obligation would take over and hold installed 
capacity to C*. The purchase price will be inflated by market power. Performance 
incentives will halve. 
 
Design Combination 2, the energy-price-control approach, uses belts and suspenders. 
Whichever sets the higher standard, C* or the High Spot Prices, will dominate, unless the 
capacity requirement is weak-kneed. In fact energy-only approaches spend almost no 
time describing load’s obligation or its enforcement, and their rhetoric indicates they 
intend to rely on load aversion to risk as the main inducement to buy hedges. So their 
enforcement of the mandate or obligation may be intentionally weak. So far, except for 
Singh’s combined approach, there is no sign that energy-only approaches would use the 
mandate or obligation to drive up the price of hedges to replace missing money and 
induce investment. If they do not, then they rely entirely on the erratic method of spot-
price control. 
 
Because the capacity-target approach is a more accurate method of inducing the 
desired level of reliability, it seems inappropriate to add on an erratic energy-price 
method of controlling investment. Better to let the capacity-target handle the adequacy 
problem and let the hedged spot prices handle the performance incentive, risk 
management, and market power problems. Each design track should do what it is good at 
and what it was intended for. 
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Implications for Market power 
Under Design Combination 1, if a supplier withholds capacity from the physical-hedge 
market, it loses not just the hedge, but the High Spot Prices. This makes withholding 
quite expensive. Nonetheless, the auction design for ISO-NE’s long-term capacity market 
is largely focused on preventing existing generation from exercising market power. If 
withholding were practically free, the problem would be much more difficult. Design 
Combination 2 would make withholding much cheaper. But another consideration further 
aggravates the market-power problem of Design Combination 2. 
 
As just discussed, it is difficult to define the exact role of the hedge obligation 
specified in energy-only designs. It appears that load is to be largely motivated by a 
desire to avoid risk and market power, and that the obligation is intended to play only a 
minor role in motivating load’s purchase of the obligatory hedges. The idea is that load 
has almost enough economic motivation and just needs a small push from the regulator. 
An “energy-only” market design could accommodate a mandatory load 
hedge (MLH) requirement. This would be a regulatory intervention to 
address the concern that there would be inadequate forward contracting. 
(Hogan 2005, p. 27) 
This means some penalty for non-compliance is needed and both Oren and Bidwell 
mention such penalties. But the idea of a “regulatory intervention to address the concern 
that there would be inadequate forward contracting” has been previously addressed by 
Hogan and Harvey (2000) in “California Electricity Prices and Forward Market 
Hedging,” published in the midst of the California meltdown. 
 
This paper argues against the position of the CAISO’s Market Surveillance 
Committee (MSC), which stated in its September 2000 report that “Eliminating 
restrictions on UDC [LSE] forward financial contracting can significantly limit the ability 
of generators to exercise market power.”38 The idea of that report was that if LSEs could 
hedge, they would sign forward contracts with suppliers and this would essentially 
eliminate the market power of the suppliers. 
 
But Hogan and Harvey argue that while long-term contracts certainly reduce spot 
market power, suppliers will demand a high price for signing contracts that eliminate 
their market power, and that was when the CAISO’s price cap was $250, not the $10,000 
level now proposed. 
Relying on buyers to engage in forward market hedging per se is not 
likely to have significant benefits in mitigating the market power of 
sellers. (p. 1) 
We find that there is little or no evidence to support the argument that the 
mere opportunity to arrange long-term forward market contracts would 
mitigate market power. … placing the pressure on the buyers in the 
current market might have the opposite of the intended effect, leading to 
higher not lower overall costs. (p. 2) 
                                                 
38 UDC or utility distribution company is equivalent in this context to today’s load serving entity (LSE). 
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The common sense question looms as to exactly why generators 
possessing market power would be prepared to offer low price contracts in 
order to lower the spot price and lower their own profits? (p. 7) 
On balance, therefore, the net implication of these various game theoretic 
formulations is at best mixed, and there is no compelling theoretical 
argument that would support the conclusion that generators possessing 
market power would unwittingly surrender that market power simply 
because customers came asking for long-term contracts. (Harvey and 
Hogan 2000, p. 8) 
To summarize, under Design Combination 2, the regulator will have to apply 
considerable pressure on the buyers to get them to pay enough so that suppliers surrender 
that market power which they have gained from the new $10,000 spot prices. Although 
arguing against the implications of a cheap transition to long-term contracting implicit in 
the MSC report, Hogan and Harvey point out that to some extent the MSC actually 
agreed with their analysis. 
In making their forward contracting decisions, load-serving entities must 
trade off the benefits of reduced average spot prices against the increased 
prices that they may need to be pay in forward markets to purchase a 
sufficient amount of forward energy to cause generators to bid 
aggressively in the spot energy markets. 
Generators must bear in mind that signing significant long-term financial 
forward commitments to supply energy, even at very attractive prices, 
commits them to be very aggressive suppliers of energy in the spot 
market, which can reduce average spot prices. –MSC Report, p.10. 
It appears the two sides were not far apart, and both agreed that LSEs would need to 
pay increased prices to induce suppliers to give up their spot market power. What can be 
done about this dilemma? Now that spot prices have been suppressed and we are 
contemplating restoring them to a more appropriate level, there is a simple answer. Do 
not give the suppliers the High Spot Prices and then Mandate that load pay increased 
prices for forward contracts to buy back the market power just handed to the suppliers 
with the $10,000 price cap. Instead, use the High Spot Prices as a carrot for the 
generators. Offer them high prices if they sell the load a hedge—if they surrender their 
market power in advance.  
 
It would be possible for load to take advantage of existing suppliers by keeping their 
prices suppressed while purchasing new generation with RFPs. That is not the 
suggestion; this is simply to note how much power load now has. Load can easily use that 
same power to ask suppliers to give up their spot market power before they are given 
High Spot Prices. This is what Design Combination 1 does.  
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14. Conclusion 
Energy markets were quite efficiently dispatched under regulation and improved dispatch 
was not a primary reason for restructuring. Better investment and performance were 
primary reasons and some striking improvements have been seen in the performance of 
nuclear units, among others. But investment has been more subject to boom-bust cycles 
and risk premiums have increased from among the lowest of any industry to among the 
highest. Both effects can impose significant cost on consumers. 
 
To achieve the central objectives of restructuring, three problems must be addressed. 
(1) Generating resources must be stabilized at an adequate level (the quantity problem). 
(2) Investors must efficiently tradeoff costs against plant characteristics, such as 
flexibility, needed by the system (the quality problem). (3) Existing plants should be 
operated and maintained efficiently in keeping with unsuppressed real-time prices (the 
performance problem). The root of all three problems is the same—price suppression for 
the sake of controlling market power. 
 
Although a Resource Adequacy program is focused on the first problem (quantity), 
solving this may only restore the stability lost in the move to competition. To capture the 
promise of restructuring, the second two problems must also be solved. Because all three 
have the same root cause, it is sensible and efficient to solve all three at once. Naturally, 
such a design starts by restoring the High Spot Prices that have been suppressed. This 
requires (1) that load be protected from the negative market power and risk side effects of 
high prices. Consequently, (2) load must be fully hedged. Call options can do this without 
interfering with the performance and quality incentives of high prices. The price paid for 
these call options will control the level of installed capacity, so (3) call option prices are 
determined in an annual forward auction for new capacity. 
 
Such a program is the most market-based solution currently possible. It relies on the 
market to solve both the quality and performance problems. It also relies on the market to 
determine the cost of new capacity. It is not yet possible for the market to determine what 
quantity of capacity is required to satisfy the consumer’s desire for reliability, because 
this desire is not expressed in current markets. 
 
A stable capacity market would assure adequate reliability, prevent crises caused by 
underinvestment, reduce market power in the energy market, and perhaps most 
significantly, greatly reduce the industry’s risk premium which otherwise promises to 
raise the cost of all existing capacity through the law of one price. 
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15. Appendix 1:  Terms and Symbols 
 
Basic Design The illustrative FCM design sketched in Sections 5 and 11 
Benchmark peaker The cheapest (fixed cost) capacity that the market would build 
C Installed capacity 
C*  adequate capacity level 
Demand-Side Flaws Two flaws that prevent the market from determining adequacy 
 Neither flaw is “market power.” (See Section 6)  
EFORd “Equivalent Forced Outage Rate, Demand related,” e.g. 7% 
FCM A forward (installed) capacity market as in the Basic Design. 
FCP Fixed cost of a Benchmark peaker 
Good supplier One that supplies its share of load + reserves at all times 
High Spot Prices Spot prices high enough to induce adequate capacity, C* 
ICAP Installed capacity (market) 
ISO Independent system operator 
PIC Installed capacity price 
LOLP Lost of Load Probability 
LOLP 3 hours / 10 years, the reliability standard (italics) 
M Price multiplier used to determine “Higher Spot Prices” 
MISO Midwest ISO 
Pcap Price cap 
Share A supplier’s fraction of total capacity sold 
SR Scarcity revenue (above VCP) 
SRShare Individual scarcity revenue share. Total SR times (individual C)/C* 
Standard Example The market model and FCM first described in Section 5, p. 15. 
VCP Variable cost of a Benchmark unit peaker 
VOLL Average value of lost load in a load-shedding event ($2,000k to 
$250,000/MWh) 
 
  65   
16. Appendix 2:  Frequently Asked Questions 
 
1. Why is a “peaker” the right standard for missing money? 
2. Why is VOLL relevant? 
3. What if parameters are estimated too high?  Will consumers overpay? 
4. Isn’t there something wrong with such high ICAP prices? 
5. Doesn’t Australia’s market prove the energy-only approach works? 
6. If markets have no clue as to reliability, why do they work at all? 
7. Don’t we have too much reliability and isn’t this very expensive? 
8. How much demand elasticity do we need before the market can take over? 
9. Are risk premiums important compared to the capacity level ? 
10. What are the main differences between ISO-NE’s LICAP and FCM? 
 
1. Why is a “peaker” the right standard for missing money? 
Any type of unit could be used as the benchmark unit, as they all give the same answer to 
the question how much scarcity revenue is needed. Consider a market with two types of 
units, baseload and peaker. In equilibrium, both units will cover their fixed costs, but if 
scarcity revenues are defined as revenues accruing from the part of price that is above the 
highest variable cost, VCP (the variable cost of a peaker), then baseload units cover fixed 
costs with a combination of infra-marginal revenues (from the part of price below VCP) 
and scarcity rents, while peakers can only cover them with scarcity rents. Hence we know 
a peaker must receive scarcity revenue = FCP to break even. 
 
In equilibrium, baseload plants must also break even, and they should earn the same 
amount of scarcity revenue as a peaker since they are just as likely to be running when 
price is greater than VCP as is a peaker. They cannot be earning either too much or too 
little in equilibrium, otherwise it would not be an equilibrium. Hence, in equilibrium, a 
baseload plant needs to earn FCP of scarcity revenue in order to break even. In fact, this is 
the scarcity revenue needed by any type of plant to break even when the market is in 
equilibrium with the optimal mix of plants. 
2. Why is VOLL relevant? 
When supply can equal demand, economics tells us that price should be set to make them 
equal. If neither side is exercising market power (trying to influence the market price), 
the price that brings about this equality is the competitive price. This tells us how to set 
price at all times when supply can equal demand. But when this is impossible what 
should be done? Supply cannot equal demand at times when demand is greater than the 
amount of supply physically available, and in this case, some load will be shed. The 
question then becomes what should be paid when there is load shedding, or as it is 
sometimes call “lost load.” 
 
The market cannot answer this question because markets cannot set an efficient price 
when the supply and demand curves do not intersect. But there is an answer. There is a 
price that, like a competitive price, is efficient because it makes consumers and suppliers 
do the right thing to greatest extent that any price can, given the infrastructure. There is a 
price, which if set whenever load must be shed, will lead to the optimal level of 
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investment. This is the price that maximizes total consumer benefit minus the cost of 
production including both marginal and fixed costs. 
 
The efficient price when load must be shed is VOLL, the value of lost load. In fact, 
the VOLL is best defined as the price that will neither overbuild nor underbuild capacity 
if it is paid whenever load is shed. Defined that way, it can be shown to equal (for simple 
models of consumer utility) the average value (willingness to pay) of serving one more 
MW of load rather than shedding it. 
 
Although it is very difficult to determine this value, it is still an important value 
because it is the value that indicates how much reliability consumers are willing to pay 
for and how much capacity should be built. Any other value reflects the engineers or 
regulators desires, rather than the consumer’s valuation. 
3. What if parameters are estimated too high?  Will consumers overpay? 
In a short-term ICAP market, the demand curve is set to pay the estimated annualized 
cost of a new Benchmark peaker, about $95,000/MW-year in ISO-NE. If this turned out 
to be high by $35,000, which is about the most imagined, the market will balance with 
about 3% too many peakers (assuming the LICAP demand curve). With this much extra 
capacity, the ICAP demand curve will set a price of $60,000.  
 
In New England, where there is excess capacity, the price would start even lower, 
and the capacity level would fall until it stopped at 3% above the target, and there would 
be no overpayment. Once this happens the demand curve would be lowered to reflect re-
estimated peaker costs. Three percent extra capacity increases retail costs by about one 
half percent and this would only last till the curve was adjusted. In a forward capacity 
market, the capacity price is based on new entry bids, so it is not affected by any error in 
estimating FCP. 
 
The multiplier, M, only affects performance, not average cost. With M too high 
suppliers will perform slightly better than consumers would want to pay for, but the 
resulting inefficiency would be small unless M was drastically over estimated. 
4. Isn’t there something wrong with such high ICAP prices? 
Currently U.S. electricity markets are in an unfortunate position. Gas prices have more 
than doubled; gas prices frequently set the market price, and baseload units are reaping 
windfall gains. This is one of the un-advertised risks of using markets. So far, this cost 
impact has been disguised by a surplus of capacity which depresses energy prices. 
However, when new capacity is needed, a market approach requires that ICAP or energy 
prices paid to every unit must increase to the point where investments will at least break 
even. If we are lucky, non-gas baseload plants will enter at low ICAP prices, because 
they are currently so profitable. But if there are barriers to baseload entry, the 
ICAP/energy price may need to rise to cover the cost of a benchmark peaker. 
 
The result could be energy costs that are considerably higher than under regulation, 
because regulation does not permit sustained windfall gains from changes in relative fuel 
prices. The data indicate that this may become a problem in ISO-NE. A market will 
permit such gains until the technology mix can readjust. 
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5. Doesn’t Australia’s market prove the energy-only approach works? 
We asked an independent investor with experience in three different international 
markets to gives us his opinion of Australia’s market. This is his reply. 
 
“My view of the Australian market was that the veneer of privatization was pretty 
thin (about 2/3 of the generation is publicly owned and more than ½ of the retail), that 
retail competition was not particularly effective, and that investment decisions were often 
influenced by government policy rather than purely market forces.  During my stay there, 
pool prices hovered in the $25-$35 range.  The energy component of retailers’ bills were 
>$60.  I’d have guessed that the cost of new entry for baseload plant would have been 
>$45 (gas) and >$50 (coal). 
 
I’ve asked the guys in our Australian office to compile a list of the generation adds 
during that period, but my recollection was that even in the face of pool prices that 
apparently were below the cost of new entry, significant entry nonetheless occurred (both 
coal and gas).  Some of the gulf in the economics would be attributable to environmental 
legislation which was coming into effect and was structured as an incentive for new.  It 
was my guess however, that much was also the result of other government policies 
(particularly in Qld) which saw government owned generators contracting with 
government owned retailers at out-of-market prices to underpin the new plants. 
 
It’s hard to know what the deals were but I’d suggest that before anyone placed too 
much faith on the Australian model, they at least check into the possibility that non-
market forces may be playing a significant role.” 
 
Oren (2005) appears to agree: “all the designs … worldwide abandoned the principle 
that ‘the market should determine the desirable level of investment’ and are relying on 
engineering based determinations of generation adequacy requirements. This is done … 
through publication of a long term statement of investment opportunity, like in 
Australia.” 
6. If markets have no clue as to reliability, why do they work at all? 
Dynamic systems need stabilizers (negative feedback loops) to keep from wandering far 
from equilibrium. Capacity markets have gotten a few percent too tight, and have been 
overbuilt by ten or twenty percent, but that’s as far astray as they have wandered. This 
indicates there are stabilizers. What are they? 
 
 First, regulators have set the energy-only parameters just about right. Energy 
prices may be four times too low, but they rise very quickly once capacity is in short 
supply. So even with this crude setting, we would expect the market to stay about in the 
range observed. Second, as was seen in California, if the market wanders a bit too far, a 
strong political feedback loop will activate and adjust the capacity level. Third, eastern 
markets include ICAP markets and these help keep the capacity level near the 
engineering target level. In other words, energy markets have at least three crude 
resource-adequacy mechanisms already in effect, and all three are controlled by 
administrators or politics.  
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7. Don’t we have too much reliability and isn’t this very expensive? 
We may well be buying more installed capacity than can be justified on the basis of 
increased reliability, but if so, it is costing us very little. 
 
The word on the street, perhaps apocryphal, is that the one-day-in-ten-years standard 
was invented by two engineers who wanted to help their company sell more generators. 
Certainly, the standard could not look more suspicious. Where did the “10” come from? 
That is simply the roundest number, the base of our number system, and was probably 
determined by the fact that we have ten digits on our two hands. A year is the time it 
takes the earth to circle the sun. Could it be that these two facts exactly correspond with 
the amount of reliability consumers want, regardless of the cost of new generation? 
 
This justified suspicion of gold-plated reliability has led economists to claim that we 
have a big problem, and are wasting a lot of money. Unlike engineers, economists 
frequently forget to use the backs of envelopes. Engineers have a pretty good feel for 
what is needed to run a power system. Certainly they like to have an easy time in the 
control room and may exaggerate system requirements for that reason. But there is 
overwhelming evidence that if the normal target of 118% of expected peak load were cut 
to say 108%, the engineers would be genuinely petrified, and the resulting rolling 
blackouts would cause headlines and political repercussions that would soon force a more 
conservative approach.  
 
How much would this 8.5% reduction of capacity save? Extra capacity for reliability 
is the cheapest capacity to build because it is almost never used. The cost used in this 
paper is $80,000/MW-year, so saving 8.5% of 50,000 MW would save $340 million per 
year. If system load averages 25,000 MW and retail cost averages $120/MWh, total 
annual retail cost is $26.3 billion. Even if we cut reliability to the point where dispatchers 
were distraught, blackouts from inadequate capacity were commonplace, and power 
markets were in a constant meltdown, we would save consumers only 1.3% of retail costs 
($340M / 26.3B). 
 
This point is important because the desire to save on capacity by “letting the market 
decide” on reliability is the major driving force behind the energy-only VOLL approach 
to resource adequacy. Not only is the argument erroneous because the market has no clue 
as to the value of VOLL (so administrators will still drive investment), but the hoped-for 
savings is diminutive at best, and perhaps nonexistent. 
8. How much demand elasticity do we need before the market can take over? 
We do not know. If we knew VOLL, and followed simple economic theory, this is how 
demand elasticity would eventually replace the regulator. First, economic theory says to 
set the real time price to VOLL only during load-shedding events. As demand elasticity 
increases below VOLL, suppliers will earn more scarcity revenue from prices set by 
demand. This means they will earn less from VOLL, which means there will be fewer 
load shedding hours, which means reliability will increase. 
 
Contrary to the energy-only view, a well functioning market will likely buy more 
reliability, not less. As load shedding due to adequacy problems becomes less frequent 
the value of VOLL will play a smaller roll. Eventually VOLL = $2,000 and VOLL = 
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$250,000 will provide almost that same level of reliability because fixed cost recovery 
has shifted from 100% based on load shedding to 99% based on prices set by demand. At 
this point there is essentially perfect reliability with regard to adequacy problems (but not 
with regard to ice storms, lightning, nuclear outages, and other contingencies). One 
challenge in assessing this outcome is that the only legitimate demand elasticity comes 
from the part of the demand curve below VOLL, and we do not know VOLL.  
9. Are risk premiums important compared to the capacity level ? 
A stable forward capacity market with solid backing from the CAISO and regulators, 
could quite possibly reduce risk premiums by 4%. In California, perhaps by 6%. The 
principle component of fixed costs is the required return on capital, about 15%. Suppose 
total fixed costs are 20% of the overnight cost, including the risk premium. Suppose a 5% 
risk premium was removed by a stable capacity market, dropping fixed costs to 15% of 
the overnight cost. This would reduce the fixed cost of a peaker from $80,000/MW-year 
to $60,000/MWh. Since the fixed cost of a peaker dictates the equilibrium price of all 
capacity (above inframarginal rents), this reduction would save $1 billion per year in a 
50,000 MW system. 
10. What are the main differences between ISO-NE’s LICAP and FCM? 
First note that FCM is not the approach being negotiated by the interested parties in early 
2006. The negotiated approach contains some of the FCM design, but as is typical of 
ICAP approaches, stakeholders are adding many non-market-based features, particularly 
in the area of performance incentives. The main difference between LICAP and FCM is 
the use of a forward market to allow new capacity to set the price paid to all capacity. 
This should stabilize the level of installed capacity and stabilize the capacity price more. 
 
The form of the performance incentive has also been changed, but this is more a 
matter of appearance than substance. LICAP charged suppliers roughly 1/N years worth 
of ICAP payment per shortage hour missed, where N is the number of shortage hours per 
year. If a supplier missed 20% of the shortage hours in one year, it would miss about 20% 
of LICAP payments for one year. Since the LICAP payment is equivalent to High Spot 
Prices, this incentive is equivalent to High Spot Prices. One difference from spot price 
incentives is that the shortage-hour penalty depends on how quickly new shortage hours 
occur. In spite of this, the shortage hour incentive does not depend on what comes after 
the missed hour, because this information is not known at the time of the shortage hour. 
 
Like FCM, LICAP completely hedges load. Scarcity revenues above a certain strike 
price are subtracted from the LICAP payment. Hence, if there is a hot summer, with triple 
the normal amount scarcity revenue, this is subtracted from the LICAP payment and the 
combination of LICAP payment plus scarcity revenue does not change. LICAP payments 
can be viewed as purchasing a call option on scarcity revenues, exactly as proposed by 
Oren who criticizes LICAP without recognizing this similarity. 
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